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HEALTH CARE'S ''THIRTY YEARS WAR'': 
THE ORIGINS AND DISSOLUTION 
OF MANAGED CARE 
THOMAS R. MCIEAN* & EDWARD P. RICHARDS** 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1618, Reformation and the Catholic Church's Counter-Ref­
ormation engulfed Europe in a complex war that lasted until the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In a similar manner, the passage of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 1 in 1974, 
and the ensuing growth of managed care, have engulfed health 
care in a holy war between insu rers, physicians, and patients over 
the control of medical decisionmaking. This fight is driven by the 
increasing cost of health care, both in absolute terms and as a per­
centage of the Gross National Product (GNP). Private and govern­
mental health care insurers, who pay for almost all health care in 
the United States, argue that traditional fee-for-service medicine 
created incentives that increase cost and lead to substandard medi­
cal care through over-treatment and inappropriate treatment. 
Many patients and health care p roviders counter that insurers want 
to cut costs without regard to quality of care. The battleground is 
state legislatures and state courts, where opponents of managed 
care initiate tort lawsuits and draft state insurance regulations. 
Initially, courts ruled that ERISA's preemption clause2 prevents 
states from regulating ERISA-qualified plans, either directly or indi­
rectly through tort litigation. These rulings gave ERISA managed 
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l. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)). 
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. � ll44(a) (stating that ERISA provisions "shall supersede any and all State laws 
msofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan," barring 
certain exemptions). 
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care plans a significant economic edge in the market: ERISA p lans 
could control physician decisionmaking w ith impunity, while non­
ERISA plans faced state benefit mandates and mountir_ig medi�al 
malpractice litigation.3 A5 ERISA plans became the dominant deliv­
erers of health care, however, managed care horror stories began to 
appear on the nightly news and in t he courts. Over time, t�ese 
horror stories caused the courts to re-examine ERISA pre emption, 
culminating in a series of United States Supreme Court cases be­
tween 2000 and 2003 that have dramatically changed the leg al land­
scape for managed care. This article reviews the rise and fall of 
ERISA preemption and its impact on managed care, and considers 
how this developing issue will affect health care in the United 
States. 
Part I of this article reviews the p re-ERISA landscape of medi­
cal care delivery and how it was shaped by the issues associated with 
traditional health insurance. This section further explains how 
medical inflation arises both from a very real expansion of medical 
needs and from medical imperialism-the failure of the medical 
care paradigm in the United States. Part II of this article examines 
the rise of ERISA-p rotected Managed Care Organizations (MCOs)4 
and their effects on medical care de livery. Part III of this article 
analyzes the Supreme Court's retrenchment on ERISA pre emp tion, 
beginning with Pegram v. Herdrich5 and culminating with Kentucky 
Ass'n of Health Plans v. MiUer.6 While Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans 
may not be the health care Treaty of Westphalia, it will have 
profound effects on health care insurance. Finally, Part IV of this 
�rticle ?iscusses how the erosion of ERISA protections and the ever 
mcreasmg cost of health care will drive market consolidation in 
hea�t? insur�nce ,7 shifting health insure r management of medical 
deos1onmakmg towards a system run in accordance with national 
3. SPP, P.g., Fox v. Health Net, 1993 WL 794305 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside Cty., 
�ec. 23. 1993) (state court jury awarded $89,128,153 in damages, including puni­
t
_
"·e damages, agams� a plan that delayed the patient's receiving what was then 
ums1dered an experimental treatment). 
4. �h
.
is is the 
_u_
mbrell� term for health insurance plans that impose controls o.n phvs1oan 
_
deos1onmakmg, either directly or through financial incentives. 
Courts, mclu?m? the United States Supreme Court, tend to use "health mainte­'..iance �i�·gan�zatton" �HMO) as a generic term, but this is an incorrect usage.  H��-0 11nphes a par�te.ular type of organizational structure, usually with a captive ph)s1c1an group provtdmg care on a fixed cost basis. 
5. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
fi. 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003) . 
. 7. For 
_
additional infrirmation, see Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, l·./Wi:\ l'rP-b11/1tw11: High Court'.� Road Map, NA·1"L LJ, June 9, 2003, at 39. 
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guidelines that define "medical necessity" and appropriate medical 
procedure.H \i\'e argue that this brave new world of standardized 
medical care may improve care in some situations and can lower 
costs while preserving or impnwing the quality of care. On the 
other hand, we argue that the construction and mass utilization of 
clinical guidelines does not address the failure of the United States 
to examine the underlying social welfare and environmental issues 
that lead to poor health and increase the cost of medical care. 
Moreover, we assert that guideline-driven protocols fail to address 
universal access to care and the tragic choices implicit in a system 
based on a paradigm that promises cures and miracles for aging 
and death itselfY 
I. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MEDICINE 
The most important constant in medical care and the medical 
care delivery system is change: medicine is not a stable industry, 
and its development is shaped by economic and political factors as 
much as by science. Medical insurance does not just pay for medi­
cal care-it shapes the medical care delivery system, determines 
what treatments are developed, and formulates our view of what 
constitutes medical care. Medical care is a hybrid industry based on 
applied technology and services. The technology component is 
global and subject to global market forces. Medical care in France, 
Germany, and the United States is based on the same science, but 
medical care in European countries is very different from care in 
the United States. For instance, compared to the rest of the world, 
the United States is much more likely to expend resources to apply 
high-tech solutions to commonplace medical conditions, even 
when such expenditures may not improve medical care in any sig­
nificant fashion.1<> The service component of medicine in the 
United States (its personal aspect) re mains very local and is shaped 
8. For additional information, see Thomas R. McLean, The Implications of Pa­
tient Safety Research & Risk Managed Care, 26 S. ILL U. LJ. 227 (2002) [hereinafter 
Implications]; Thomas R. McLean, The Institute of Medicine and the Risk Managed Care 
Revolution, GREATER KAN. CnY Mm. BULL. Apr., 2001, at 16-19. 
9. See infra notes 52-54; see also Gumo CAl.ABREsr & PHILIP Boss1rr, TRAGIC 
CHOICES (1978). 
10. For example, consider coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) surgery. 
Approximately 600,000 CABG procedures are perlormed annually in the United 
States, only two-thirds of which may have been medically appropriate. David A. 
Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based Compensation for 
Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1427, 1437, 1487 (2001). Per capita, the 
United States perlorms far more CABGs than any other country in the world. 
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by state and federal laws and norms. To understand how these two 
components interact, it is necessary to conside� the development of 
modem medicine from a historian's perspecttve. 
A. Pre-World War II 
While modern medicine has some roots in the systematic ob­
servations of the alchemist Paracelsus, 11 it is best dated to the work 
of Ignaz Semmelweis, a French obstetrician who introduced c?n­
trolled observations and statistical analysis with his studies of child­
bed fever in the mid 1800s.12 While few of Semmelweis' 
contemporaries took heed of his observation that physicians' dirty 
hands spread disease, his work was fundamental to the later work of 
Pasteur and Koch, who developed the germ theory of disease, and 
Lister, who showed how to clean medical equipment and personnel 
to prevent infection. Coupled with the discovery of anesthesia, the 
germ theory transformed surgical practice from a mostly unsuccess­
ful and extremely unpleasant process to a life-saving intervention. 
In the late 1800s, for the first time in history, a patient's 
chances of survival were improved by seeing a physician and going 
to a hospital. This fueled both medical licensing movements and 
the expansion of hospitals and medical practice.1'.'\ At the same 
time, the sanitation movement in public health began to dramati­
cally reduce the death rate associated with infectious diseases. In 
aggregate, the innovations of the latter years of the nineteenth cen­
tury led to a rapid increase in life expectancy and the beginnings of 
a public expectation of life-long health rather than disease and 
death. 
In contrast, innovation and regulation came slowly to the non­
surgical fields of medicine.14 Non-surgical medicine changed little 
Hans G. Brost, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Thoracic Surgeons 
Uan. 2000). 
. 11. Early 16th Century alchemist and mystic. See William Osler, The Evolu-ll�� of Modern Medicine, A Series of Lectures Delivered at Yale University on the 
S1lhman Foundation in April, 1913, avai/,ab/,e al http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/Books/ 
osler/modern_medicine.htm (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American 
Law) (last visited Oct. 23, 2003). 
12. lcNAZ PHILIPP SEMMELWEIS, THE ETIOLOGY, CONCEPT, AND PROPHYLAXIS OF 
C11IU>BE1> hwR (K. Codell Carter ed., trans., The Univ. of Wisc. Press 1983). 
13. PAUL STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 156-57 
(1982). 
. 
14'. F�r a more detailed discussi�n of health care and the regulation of health care. pnm to_ 1930, �ee .Edward P. Richards, The Police Powl?r and the Regulation of Mt>'.l_iral Pmrl1c�: A Histon�al Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Phpwnns 111 /�RISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 
t004] ERISA PREEMPTION IN MANAGED CARE 287 
until the 1930s and 1940s, when the introduction of a ntibiotics al­
lowed the successful treatment o f  common infections such as pneu­
monia and tuberculosis. As medicine became more e ffective, there 
was more concern about providing access to medical care. In the 
1930s, medical insurance was introduced in two forms: the Kaiser­
Permanente and Blue Cross plans. 
When the Grand Coulee Dam was being built, construction was 
hampered by a logistic problem: how to provide health care work­
ers to care for the employees at the remote dam construction site? 
George Kaiser introduced a model whereby his company would 
make arrangements with physicians to provide health care for a 
fixed-maximal fee.1f> While many believe that capitated medical 
care was not invented until Health Maintenance Organizations ap­
peared in the late 1960s, the history of MCOs can actually be traced 
to Kaiser's Grand Coulee Dam plan. However, because MCOs did 
not reap the financial rewards of fee-for-service (FFS) 16 medicine, 
they were relegated to the sidelines of medical care until the 1970s. 
The first Blue Cross plan was developed in Baylor, Texas. In 
1929, Baylor University Hospital offered to provide hospital care for 
up to twenty-one days for teachers who were willing to purchase 
insurance coverage for six dollars a year.17 At first, the purpose of 
this type of plan was not so much to provide health benefits as to 
keep cash flowing into hospitals.18 Over time, though, Baylor's 
plan for hospital insurance evolved into an indemnity insurance 
scheme. The resulting Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance system 19 
became the quintessential FFS health insurance plan i n  that it pro­
vided first dollar coverage for all medical expenses that were "usual, 
customary and reasonable."20 
202-20 (1999); Thomas R. McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm: Autonomous Physi­
cian Extenders Will Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for Health Care Deliv­
ery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239, 244-46 (2002) [hereinafter Quality Chasm]. 
15. See Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians In Managed Care: 
A Multidimensional Analysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18]. LEGAL 
Mrn. 443, 447 n.20 (1997). 
16. Also c alled indemnity insurance, this is traditional health insurance that 
pays for what the physician orders without trying to manage the physician's medi­
cal decisionmaking. 
17. GEORGE D. LUNDBERG & JAMES STACY, SEVERED TRUST: WHY AMERJCAN 
MEDICINE HASN'T BEEN FIXED 24 (2000). 
18. Id. at 25. 
19. Ten years after the Blue Cross hospital insurance was introduced, Blue 
Shield, a physician insurance scheme that was analogous to Blue Cross ,  was intro­
duced. Id. at 82. 
20. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Columbia/HCA: Villain Or Victim?, HEALTH A.FF., 
Mar./ Apr. 1998, at 30, 31 (Medicare, set up in 1964, adopted the same "usual, 
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Blue Cross plans (which cover hospital services) a
_
nd Blue 
Shield plans (which cover physician services) were orgamzed ai:d 
run by physicians and hospitals, so it i s  not surprising that they paid 
what providers charged. Indeed, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans be­
came emblematic of FFS health insurance because they rewarded 
physicians for providing medical services, and lacked mechanisms 
whereby negative feedback could be used to inhibit the o ver-pre­
scription of medical services. Accordingly, in a FFS incentive envi­
ronment, physicians overutilize (i.e., over-prescribe) health care 
treatment.21 Additionally, FFS lacks a mechanism to define "medi­
cal necessity," as it relies on physicians to make all medical deci­
sions.22 This was not a significant problem prior to 1960, when 
efficacious medical treatment was largely limited to the prescription 
of antibiotics and some straightforward surgical procedures, and 
when physicians were limited in their capacity to over-treat patients. 
During the 1960s, however, high technology found the medical 
field, and physicians began to offer patients such expensive items as 
transplantation,2:-:1 coronary artery bypass surgery, and 
chemotherapy. 
B. Post-World War II-Medical Imperialism and Medical Inflation 
In the decades following World War II, medical care in the 
United States, and its costs, have been shaped by three economic 
factors: third-party payment for medical care, FFS reimbursement, 
and the expansion of the nation's capacity to provide high-tech 
customary, and reasonable" standard developed by the private health insurance 
plans.). 
2 I. Nor was there any informal brake on our health care system. After the 
�overnment determined that health insurance was an "ordinary and n ecessary" 
business exp�nse, health care was increasingly provided by business as an em­
plmt'l' hcneht. . ·�Pf' 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2000). Thus, because employers ultimately bore the cost of insurance, the employee-patients had an incentive to demand all 
the health care they could get . 
. .. 22 
.
. 
Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability far Breach 
rifh1'.1mmy Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption far State Law 
l.111/n/it_\' f<'.r 1Wed1m� Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. R.E.v. 1, 34 (2001) ("Tradition­
a � h, trea�mg physicians have been proud of their individual autonomy ...  "). �- nder FFS reimbursement, physicians like to tell patients that everything possible 
t� bemg dc�ne (physicians have "seen themselves as being the patient's advocate"), 
id., btll •. clomg e�erythin� poss�ble may not be best when it leads physicians to pro­
\ irle tl c atment m fields m whJCh they are inadequately trained and more likely to 
commn error. 
· .  .2'.�/�rg�n
. 
transp
_
lan�� are especially expensive because they have a large ini-11·11 swgtcal cost, requu-e hfe-long treatment with dangerous expensive drugs and ha\"l' l11gh long-term compl ication rates. 
' 
' 
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medical care. These factors are interrelated and inseparable. War­
time price and wage controls encouraged employers to recruit 
scarce \\'orkers by offering them 11011-\\'agc benefits. A.s it became 
increasingly popular for workers to recei\'l· health insurance bene­
fits, more individuals were covered by third-party insurnnce, which 
further fueled the public 's desire for medical care. 21 The federal 
government responded to this desire by subsidizing the construc­
tion of community hospitals throug h  the Hill-Burton program.2�' 
With more hospitals going up, medical training programs ex­
panded and, by 1980, it was clear that this expansion would soon 
lead to a surplus of physicians.2(' Lurking behind all of these devel­
opments was medical research, _increasingly facilitated by new devel­
opments in electronics and radioisotopes27 that seemed to improve 
the efficacy of the practice of medicine on a daily b asis. 
Health insurance grew problematic during this period, as these 
new treatments (and their related hospital care) proved to be much 
more expensive than prior forms of care. Most individuals could 
not pay for h igh-tech health care without insurance, but because 
the probability of any given patient needing care was relatively low, 
the cost of the insurance remained reasonable for a time. FFS re­
imbursement encouraged a "do everything" mentality. Just as the 
legal profession's requirement of zealous advocacy d rives lawyers to 
do everything the client can afford to win cases, the medical profes­
sion, drawing on essentially unlimited insurance resources, did eve­
rything it could do to save patients' lives. This meant more 
procedures, which soon included sophisticated laboratory tests; 
24. Employe1·-paid FFS insurance means that the employee pays little or noth­
ing for heal th care. Accordingly, em ployees have an incentive to demand all possi­
ble medical care, i.e., patients have no incentive to ask their physicians if the 
medical treatment prescribed is cost-effective. Thus, the third-party insurance 
served as a fin ancial ince ntive to over-utilize care, independent from the FFS in­
centive to physici ans to over-prescribe care. 
25. Hospital Survey and Constructio n  (Hill-Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 
60 Stat 1040 ( 1946) (providing federal grants to modernize hospitals that had be­
come obsole t e  due to Jack of capital investment throughout the period of the 
Great Depression and World War II). 
26. See Eli Gi nzburg , Ten Encounters With the US Health Sector, 1930-1999, 282]. 
AM. MED. Ass'N 1665, 1667 (1999) (observing that a 1980 Graduate Medical Educa­
tion National Advisory Committee report had concluded that by the year 2000 
there would be a surplus of over 150,000 physicians based on the then-current 
medical school graduation rate). 
27. Radioisotopes allow a chemical to be traced as it transverses the e nzymatic 
machinery of a cell. Thus, radioisotopes, which arose from research on the atomic 
bomb, served to elucidate the principle s  of biochemistry in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and biomolecular engin eering a generation later. 
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however, medical training did not stress the carefu� �election or un­
derstanding of diagnostic tests-instead, phys1c1ans were en-
1 1 28 couraged to order every possible test and sort out the r.e
su ts a.te�. 
Additionally, physicians were encouraged to confer with sp�ciahsts 
and to refer patients for specialist care. Although such pracu�e pat­
terns resulted in escalating health care costs, they generally did �wt 
harm patients, unless they resulted in unnecessary medical 
procedures. 
We term this model medical imperialism. Historically, its prac­
titioners have sought to treat conditions aggressively, to develop 
new and better treatments, and to expand medical facilities and 
medical technology. Medical imperialism worked very well for the 
twenty-five years between 1945 and 1970, but the passage of Medi­
care2!l and continued technological innovation ensured that health 
care costs would soon explode. 
Prior to 1970, the most significant reductions in morbidity and 
mortality were due to public health p ractices (such as water purifi­
cation) and effective antimicrobial treatment. Because such mea­
sures led to clear benefits (such as significant gains in life 
expectancy) between 1900 and 1970, no one questioned the cost of 
health care. In 1968, after the Surgeon General declared that infec­
tious diseases had been conquered, medicine turned increasingly to 
treatment of chronic diseases such as coronary artery disease and 
cancer. Unlike acute infectious diseases, chronic medical condi­
tions proved to be much more resistant to medical therapy, even 
with the application of high-tech practices. Accordingly, medical 
imperialism began to become an increasingly problematic para­
digm-the country was spending more on health care, but life ex­
pectancy no longer increased as rapidly. This era was typified by 
President Nixon's war on cancer . M odeled on the space program 
28. This uncritical habit of ordering diagnostic tests, without a clear rationale 
for each tes�, also drove "defensive medicine" because physicians who do not un­
d�rstand. 
which �e�ts to o�der also do not know how to reduce the ordering of tests 
w1tho�t jeopardmng patient care. Although p hysicians rightly worried about not 
orde
.
n�g enough tests, much diagnostic testing done under the rubric of defensive 
med1cme was really driven by ignorance and by the income it generated for labs. 
The managed care problem aggravated physicians' litigation anxiety by forcing 
them to reduce the level of diagnostic testing . 
. 29: Medicare, by expa�ding FFS health insurance to a segment of the popula­
uon th�t could not otheIWlse afford health care, increased the demand for health 
care .. ve HEALTH CARE DEUVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 160 (Anthony R. Kovner & 
�te
.
\en Jonas eds., 6th ed. 19�9). Initially, this was not a problem because only a 
small percent of the P?pul.auon reached age sixty-five; today, however, thirteen percent of the population 1s over age sixty-five, and that percentage will double 
over the next twenty years. See id. at 511. 
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started by Presiden t Kennedy, thl' war on ccu1<Tr was based on the 
assumption that cance r was just one mon· technological problem 
that could be solved if the gon�rnment put enough money into re­
search and treatnwn t. :10 More than thirtv vcars later, the hendiL-; of 
this program are still questionable. \i\'l�ile we ban� learned much 
about the biology of cancer, what we han· learned is that cancer is 
thousands of differen t diseases that han· pro\'ed n·ry resistant to 
cure. There have been m;�jor breakthroughs in the treatment of 
some relatively rare cancers, but little progress in treating the m<�jor 
killers.:11 The result of this is that ever more money is spent on 
treatment<; yielding little incremental improvement.:1'.! Ironically, 
however, expenditure of monetary and political capital on the pre­
vention of smoking (the leading cause of preventable cancer) is 
tiny compared to the money spent for the treatment of its related 
illnesses. 
Another model for chronic disease raises an even greater spec­
ter .of medical inflation. U
nlike coronary artery disease or cancer, 
patients with diabetes can live for a long time with their disease.:-i=� 
Type I diabetes occurs in childhood or early adolescence and 
m�nifests without regard to dietary or other environmental causes. 
Pnor to the development of insulin, children with diabetes died at 
an early age. Indeed, insulin has totally changed the natural history 
of this disease because type I diabetics can easily live forty or fifty 
years with their condition if it is treated with insulin. This length­
ened life expectancy means that most patients will develop one or 
more costly-to-treat complications over the course of the disease.34 
A type II diabetic is at risk to develop all of the complications of 
type I diabetes. Like type I diabetes, type II has a multifactorial 
etiology. However, type II diabetes has its onset later in life, and 
the major factor triggering type II diabetes in susceptible persons is 
30. National Cancer Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-218, 85 Stat. 778. 
31. Much of the improvement in cancer t reatments comes from simple efforts to better educate patients: as patients are now much better aware of the sign and symptoms of cancer, and have access to health care, they present for treatment at an earlier stage. Fifty years ago, it was not unusual for a woman with breast cancer to present only when the cancer had grown through her skin and d eveloped a 
�alodorous secondary i nfection. Today most women present with a painless small reast mass, which is much easier to treat. 
. 32. Much of Medicare spending accrues during the final months of a pa-lient's life. 
1 
33. Obesity is another chronic medical condition that is compatible with a 0ng life. 
34. The primary complications of diabetes are renal failure, retinopathy, and neuropathy. 
292 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 60:283 
obesity. Over the past twenty-five years the p�evalence <?f obesity 
has nearly doubled in the United States,35 and m the commg years, 
the prevalence o f  type II diabetes can also be expected to double. 
This has important implications if America attempts to control 
medical inflation by the use of guideline-driven protocols. The. In­stitute of Medicine (IOM), is undoubtedly correct that care guide­
lines will help control cost today . However, as the total population 
increases, and the percentage of obese individuals within the total 
population increases, health care costs will continue to r�se becau.se there will be many more individuals with the complications of dia­
betes. This is a major reason why the United States is poised to 
invest $100 million dollars per year on the prevention o f  diabetes, 
obesity, and such similarly preventable chronic conditions as 
asthma.36 
Medical imperialism also drives the pharmaceutical industry. 
Total spending on prescription drugs increased by over three hun­
dred percent between 1991 and 2001. 37 Drugs are developed based 
on their potential market, which is a combination of the number of 
affected persons and their willingness and ability to pay for relief. 
Most drugs are very cheap to manufacture, their main costs being 
the initial research and clinical trials necessary to get FDA approval. 
This means that drug companies d epend on patent law to protect 
their profits. Once a drug is no longer under patent protection, it 
can be cheaply manufactured by a competitor, and its price and 
profitability will fall rapidly. Because the clock begins to run on 
n�w drugs even before they are in the marketplace, drug compa­
mes ofte� have a s  few as ten years of patent exclusivity. For many 
years this system worked very well, producing new drugs that 
worked dramatically better than those that they replaced, reducing 
both patient suffering and overall health care costs. Currently, 
:��. Approximately twenty percent of the U.S. population is obese. 
%. Brook Raflo, Bush's Budget to Fund Shift to Home Care, HoMECARE, Feb. 
200'.I. at 10. Of course, many in the preventive medicine industry are poised to 
��ke ach-antage of the coming preventive healthcare market. See Susan Orenstein, 
lluPill that Will Make You Thin, Business 2.0 (Mar., 2004), available at http:/ /www. 
bmmess2.co
.
m/h2/web/articles/ 1, 17863,591634,00.html (describing attempts by 
phar'.nac�uucal mant�facturers to develop and market a pill that reduces the desire 
lrn c'.ilone cons�1mpuon) (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law) . 
. n. PR1cr:'A".·\TERHousECoorERs, CosT oF CARINc: KEY DRIVERS oF GROWTH IN 
s.l'.F:\lllN(; ()� Hosrrr..\l. CARE 6 (2003)' availabl,e at http:/ /www.pwcglobal.com/ �.xtwt"b/ serncc-.nsf I 8b9d788097dff3c9852565eOOOncOba/bf4bl l 2 l 34b51 ce78525 hrcl:IOO�:i4 249 /$�-I l .E/Final%20Executive% 20Summary%20021903. pdf (report­
u:g. an. 11�crease m national spending on prescription medication from 5.9% of 
Sihl t_i1lhon m 1991 _to �l.9% of$1.42 trillion in 2001) (on file with the NYU An-
1111.11 Sunt'\' of .'\nwncan I.aw). 
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many new drugs offer marginal or no benefits t o  most patients 
when compared with existing remedies; however, these new drugs 
cost much more than existing drugs.:18 To be profitable, drug man­
ufacturers must persuade physicians to prescribe these new drugs 
for patients who would be better served by cheaper, better, and 
safer older drugs.39 Now, biotechnology is promising drugs tailored 
to an individual's own genetic makeup, but at astronomical costs 
and with no assurance that benefits will be significantly better than 
existing therapy's. At the same time, private foundations are left to 
satisfy the critical need for public-health drugs in the developing 
world, and for the poor in the United States, as there is no one to 
pay drug manufacturers for drugs that they might develop to ad­
dress these needs. 
There are three key failings of medical imperialism. First, it 
applies a "cost is no object to cure the patient" model to chronic 
diseases that have no cure and that can only be managed and pre­
vented. 40 This model evolved from an earlier, unconstrained, fee­
for-service system. The increase in the number and costs of treat­
ments for chronic diseases, coupled with the dramatic rise in per-
38. Claritin, which recently went off-patent, offers only minor benefits over 
generic antihistamines, but costs one d ollar a day versus a few pennies. Similarly, a 
recent study has demonstrated that the most cost-effective treatment for essential 
hypertension is a cheap diuretic, rather than the many patented antihypertensive 
agents on the market that sell for substantially more money. See Lawrence J. Ap­
pel, The Verdict From ALLHAT-Thiazide Diuretics Are the Preferred Initial Therapy far 
Hypertension, 283 J. AM. MED. Ass'N, 3039-42 (2002). 
39. The general scheme of inducing a physician to prescribe a new drug is 
s�nding a good-looking sales person to call on the physician and supply the physi­
CJan with a gift. While these gifts for years were only to have token value, the sales 
representatives have proven that they can adroitly disguise the value of the gift. 
Accordingly, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has recently  issued new phar­
maceutical regulations intended to prevent the abuse of this relationship. See CoM. 
PLIANCE PROGRAM GUIDANCE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS, avai/,abl,e at 
http:/ I oig.hhs.gov /fraud/ docs/ complianceguidance/042803pharmacymfgnonfr. 
pdf (Apr. 2003) (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law). 
40. FFS reimbursement encourages physicians to over-treat, to be uncritical 
about the drug company claims for new and expensive dmgs, and to do surgical 
procedures with questionable indications. For example, coronary artery bypass 
surgery has been shown to improve longevity and quality of life for certain middle­
ag_ed patients. It is now widely used in elderly patients even though there is no 
evidence that it improves either longevity or quality of life. End-state renal disease 
(ESRD), which requires dialysis to prolong the patient's life, was a rare but serious 
condition in the 1960s. The federal government set up a special program to pay 
for dialysis and within 20 years it was p aying dramatically more patients than were 
predicted to exist. Kidney disease did not become more common, but physicians, 
who made huge profits from dialysis centers, became very creative in expandinl{ 
the diagnosis of ESRD. 
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sons with chronic diseases, accounts for most of medical inflation. 
Second, medical imperialism draws political and financial su�port 
from prevention efforts that can reduce the incidence of medically 
costly diseases. Alcoholism, HIV, and gun violen�e a ccount fo.r a huge financial burden on urban hospitals. Obesity and smok�n? 
affect all segments of health care. Yet America has expended mm1-
mal effort in preventing these problems-instead, we wait until a 
patient has acquired an advanced disease from these factor� , at 
which time we apply costly and tec hnologically complex soluuons 
to the exacerbated problem.41 Third, medical imperialism at­
tempts to "rnedicalize" all social p roblems so that they are treated 
with medications. This practice expands the umbrella of treatable 
conditions and thereby increases  the cost of health care for 
everyone.42 
Medicalizing psycho-social problems is a phenomenon well-il­
lustrated by the current treatment of alcohol and drug abuse. Only 
a few generations ago, these problems were classified as  personal 
moral failures; today, alcoholism and drug abuse are c lassified as 
treatable conditions. While treatment for such problems can be 
beneficial to individuals, it is also costly, and adds to the health care 
budget. Moreover, some have argued that medicalizing a condition 
may reduce people's  fear of that condition, and cause them to be 
less interested in preventing its onset.4� Interestingly, when society 
does benefit from providing medical treatment for social condi­
tions, the avoidance of future medical treatment, and hence costs, 
is never contemplated. Any benefits to society in rehabilitating 
drunks or drug addicts are not subtracted from the medical budget, 
so the net result is always more costs with no credit for the benefits. 
N ursing homes are another manifestation of the nation's de­
sire to "fix" societal problems tha t  stem from cultural changes. 
4 1 .  Di�betes ill.ustrates a further problem because its complications are much less snere tf th� d.1sease is carefully managed in the early stages. Many health �tans and most �nd1gent care systems make it difficult for patients to get this care­
h�I ca.r� , mcr�asmg the rate of complications such as kidney and heart d isease and 
d1sab1hty, which are much more expensive to treat. 
. 42. F?r exam�le consider the prescription of Ritalin to "hyperactive" chil­dicn. V\111\e the.re is no doubt that some children benefit from being o n  this medi­�auo�, many children are place� on Ritalin as a means of treating a dysfunctional fanuly. �ot only does the Ritahn have to be paid for, but so does the medical 
momtonng cost associated with long-term medication of children. 
43 Harvey Fie t · d · 
. 
· · 
. . r� em, �ote gay wnter a n d  actor, makes a powerful argument that the medicahzatton ol HIV has led gay men to think that it is treatable and does not need to worrv th h · .. . , em, t at It may even be seen as cool to have HIV. See Haiwv hcrstem ,  Thf' Culture of Dismse, N.Y. TIMES, July 31 ,  2003, at A25 .  
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Nursing home care. one of t h e  largest componen ts of Medicaid, is 
as much a reflection of the breakdown of the tradit ional  familv and 
the one-i n com e  household as it is a medical care issue. Ho\�'e\·er, 
the conseq u e ntial cost of providing custodial care for the elderly is 
substantial , especially when Ame rica 's  health care cosL'i are com­
pared with those of other countries:"' 
C. The /ntrodurtion of Managnl Carp 
Med ical inflation first appeared in the late 1 960s;F• touching 
off approximately two decades d u ri ng which general i n fl a tion and 
medical inflation in particular skyroc keted.41; General i n flation may 
have been d riven by the need to pay for the Vietnam \i\'ar and the 
Arab oil embargo, but the origins  of medical inflation are more 
complex. Medical inflation is not  merely the result of providers 
overutilizing expensive high-tech medical procedures to maximize 
their own self-in terest.47 Instead, six factors drive medical  inflation: 
( 1 )  health care p roviders offer new services that grea tly improve 
outcomes but either cost more than existing treatmen ts or have no 
existing analog; ( 2 )  demographic shifts increase the number of eld­
erly persons needing medical services;48 (3) lifestyle a n d  environ­
mental diseases increase the number of persons need i n g  medical 
s�rvices; ( 4) h ealth care providers charge more for the same ser­
vices; (5) h e a l th care providers offe r  new services to gain market 
44. While the United States spends much more on health care than European 
countries such as Germany, Germany spends much more on the total social wel­
far� bundle, including health care, than does the United States. People in the 
Umted States, especially those in the lower socio-economic strata, are much less 
healthy than they could be if they were better educated, had access to social wel­
fare services designed to improve health and prevent disease, and if the environ­
�e�tal causes for disease states such as obesity were better controlled. To a 
significant exte nt,  the U . S. health care system is much more expensive than com­
parable European countries' because we do not properly allocate social welfare 
spending and social costs in other sectors. 
45. See Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1 999: Hearing on HR. 1304 Be/om the 
House Comm. on the judiciary, I 06th Cong. 122, 1 24 ( 1 999) (statement of Don 
Young, M.D.,  Ch ief Operating Officer and Medical Director of the Health Insur­
ance Association of America) . 
46. Mark A. Hall , Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barril'T"s to 
Health Care Cost Containment, 1 37 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 435 ( 1 988) .  
47. Physicians c ertainly thrived under FFS, and continued to d o  so even 
under managed care. During the decade of 1 986 to 1996, physician income in­
creased seventy-seven percent to a median n e t  income of $ 1 66,000, while the aver­
age worker's income increased only forty-three percent to a median n e t  income of 
$ 25,480. LARRY LEVITT & JANET LUNDY, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND . • TRENDS AND 
INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE 65 ( 1 998) . 
48. Examples i nclude the increasing n umber of obese and elderly persons. 
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share or increase profits that are more costly but have little benefit 
over existing services, or offer unne cessary services;49 and (6) more 
services are put under the medical umbrella. 
That managed care alone would not be able to control medical 
inflation is obvious, in hindsight, because managed care cannot ad­
dress factors one through three without denying individuals
_ 
n eces­
sary care. This problem is addressed in a thoughtful article by 
David Orentlicher, who argues that managed care faile d  because 
the American public will not stand for rationing health c are: 
Managed care has failed not because of market imperfe c tions, 
a bad design, or because its design was poorly executed. 
Rather, the United States' experience with managed c are illus­
trates what happens when society tries to ration health care re­
sources, regardless of the mechanism used for rationing. In 
this view, problems with the health care market or the design 
and implementation of managed care might have affe cted h ow 
quickly managed care failed, but they did not affect whether 
managed care would fail.50 
Professor Ore n tlicher draws on the classic work Tragic Choices, by 
Guido Calabresi and Phillip Bobbitt. The theme of Orentlicher's 
article is that Americans will not stand for rationing life-savin g  med­
ical care, and that managed care was doomed to fail because it was a 
rationing system"1 that could succeed only as long as it c ould hide 
the rationing behind the rhetoric of reducing unnecessary care and 
improving quality of care. Orentlicher concludes on the bleak note 
that the future will only see a continuing shifting betwee n  subter­
fuges for rationing, with the public rejecting each approach as its 
injustices become widely appreciated.52 For example, Orentlicher 
P?sits_ 
that practice
_ 
guidelines are only a rationing subterfuge that 
d1sgu1ses va�ue choICes about the proper way to spend m edical care 
dollars behmd a fa�ade of scientific detachment. 
We believe that this bleak analysis is fundamentally correct as 
concerns factors one and two. We believe that the United States 
Supren:e Court shi.
f�ed its views o n  ERISA preemption because it 
recogmzed the pohtICal and social i mplications of allowing h ealth 
49. The drug industry provides many examples, such as new hypertension 
�rngs that are very expensive but not as effective as older agents in m ost patients. S1•r .111/1m note 38. 
. _50;, David Orentlicher,  The Rise and Fall of Managed Care: A Predictabl,e "Tragic Uw1rP.1 Phn1omenon, 47 ST. Louis U. LJ. 4 1 1 ,  4 1 2  (2003) . 
:1 1 .  Si't> id. at 4 1 3. 
'.;2. Ir/. at 420. 
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care rationing decisions to be made without public recourse. This 
shift is chronicled in Parts II and III of this article. 
We differ with Professor Orentlicher as to his opinions on fac­
tors four and five, which we believe can be addressed by managing 
physician decisionmaking, and which we believe will make a signifi­
cant difference in medical inflation. Factor three, which is the most 
critical of these problems, is beyond the reach of managed care and 
must be addressed though state and federal political action. (Fac­
tor six just demands honesty in political debate, which makes it the 
least likely to be addressed. ) Thus the dilemma in managed care: 
how do you sort out areas where costs can be contained without 
hurting the quality of care-factors four and five-from areas 
where cost containment must hurt the quality of care-factors one 
and two? 
II .  
THE RISE OF ERISA MCOS 
By 1970, medical inflation was a political issue. The Federal 
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 197353 was passed to stim­
ulate the development of managed care insurance products that 
would, ideally, help to control health care cost by decreasing medi­
cal imperialism's overutilization of high-tech health care. The key 
feature of the Federal MCO Act was its formal recognition that cost­
�ontainment measures can be an appropriate part of health 
Insurance. 54 
Managed care uses two fundamental strategies to control 
c?sts. 55 One strategy is to leave the actual care decisions to physi­
cians and other health care providers, but cap the amount of 
money they would be paid for the care of individual patients or 
groups of patients. Providers who deliver care for less than the pay-
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-l 7 (2000). 
54. See Brooks Richardson, Health Care: /<,'RISA Preemption and HMO Liability­
A Fresh Look at ERISA Preemption in the Context of Subscriber Claims Against HMOs, 49 
OKLA. L. RE.v. 677, 687-88 (1 996) (The "basic premise in every state and federal 
HMO Act remains the same: HMOs should be encouraged to operate within the 
health care market to promote efficiency and economy."). 
55. Managed care is enforced through physician financial i n ce n tives and eco­
nomic creden tialing. An HMO, for example, would withhold u p  to twenty percent 
of a physician 's income until that physician reached his or her utilization target5. 
Economic credentialing is reserved for those recalcitrant physicians who repeat­
edly do not meet their utilization goals in spite of the financial incentives: under 
such circumstances the physician con tract is simply not offered to the physician at 
the time of annual renewal. 
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ment make money, and those whose care costs more lose money.5.6 
The second strategy is to inteIVene directly in medical care d�c1-
sions by requiring pre-authorization for any but the most routme 
care, and by excluding some treatments from policy coverage.57 
Both of these strategies create conflicts of interest for h e�l th c.
are 
providers that differ from those of FFS, and both result m cla�ms 
that plans are directly or indirectly responsible for patients bemg 
denied medically necessary care.58 Initially, states attempted to 
control these s trategies by mandatin g  health benefits, while private 
attorneys filed medical malpractice suits against plans for injuries 
allegedly cause d  by denial of care. 
A year after the passage of the Federal MCO Act, Congress en­
acted ERISA. The intent of ERISA was to provide a u niform na­
tional set of laws governing pension plans so that national 
employers such as General Motors could bargain with local unions 
and have uniform national contracts. ERISA achieves this goal by 
providing comprehensive and detailed guidance for pension plans, 
and explicitly preempting any state regulation of ERISA-sheltered 
activities. However, there is virtually no mention of health plans in 
ERISA.'•!1 The o nly sentence in ERISA that mentions h ealth plans is 
found in the Act's preamble, which defines the scope of the cover­
age of ERISA. 60 
When the courts began to consider cases involving ERISA 
health plans, they looked to pension plan rules and to ERISA' s  pre­
emption of any state law that "relates t o" an ERISA plan .61 Without 
:lfi. One strategy, used .extensively by Me dicare for controlling hospitalizatio
n 
costs. was fi�ed-cost budgetmg based on diagnosis-related groups (DRG). Hospi­
tals '
.
�ere paid a fixed amount based on the patient's diagnosis. If the care they 
pnmdcd exceeded the DRG payment, they lost money. If it was less than the DRG 
parnicnt, they ��de mo�ey. Some private insurers used a similar fixed budget 
s:st�m .for physic ian s.ervices, paying physician groups a capitation payment-a 
1_m d. P•l\ lllent per patient. If the group could treat the patients for less than the 
l .ipn.nion pay�ent, . they made money. Since health insurance requires large numbers of patients m the pool to average out costs, most medical groups did not 
Inn· large h I · h h ' enoug poo s Wll t e same insurer, and consequently lost money on 
thl'se arrangements. 
:li. A concise summary of prospective utilization review can be found in 
n111u�1 1' ·  '.1wnle Health Care Systems, Inc. 1 85 F.3d 1, 1-6 ( 1st Cir. 1 999) . �H. S,pp McLean & Richards, supra note 22, at 1 7-19. :l9. Because medical inflau·on was t · · 197 · · 
· 
. . · no an issue pnor to O 1t is not surpns-111� l�t:' Congress provi.ded little guidance for health plans. 
' 
� 1 00 1  
.
b
Emplo.yee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2 ,  29 U.S.C. 
: ( ) (statmg that a purpose of the Act is to protect interests of "participants Ill t•mplovl'e benefit plans"). 
� 
J J
.�i.:
(a
;'" Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 5 1 4 (a) , 29 U.S.C. 
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more to flesh out Congressional intent, the courts concluded that 
any state law remotely related to ERISA health plans was pre­
empted. 62 This expansive view of ERISA preemption was con­
firmed i n  the early 1980s by two Supreme Court cases. 
The first of these cases was Metropolitan Life Ins urance v. Massa­
chusetts, 63 which concerned state-mandated mental health coverage. 
Specifically, the State of Massachusetts set out minimal mental 
health c overage requirements that all insurers were expected to 
provide in their contracts of insurance, but Metropolitan Life Insur­
ance argued that it did not need to provide this mandated mental 
health coverage in insurance contracts sold to E RISA plans. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the state law was 
not preempted by ERISA, a n d  the U.S. Supreme Court took the 
case on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the state law 
was one that regulated the business of insurance and thus was saved 
from ERISA preemption by the ERISA saving clause.64 However, 
the Court was careful to note that this law applied only to the con­
tracts of insurance purchase d  by ERISA plans, not to  the ERISA 
plans themselves. As the Court recognized, this decision would cre­
ate a double standard, with "plans that purchase insurance" (in­
sured plans) subject to the s tate mandated benefits laws, but plans 
that self-insured, and thus did not purchase insurance, exempt 
from the benefits mandate. 65 Thus, while the Metropolitan Life 
Court found that the specific state statute was not preempted by 
ERISA, i t  cleared the way for ERISA plans to avoid such mandates 
by self-insuring, rather than by purchasing insurance contracts 
from third party insurers. 
The second of these two cases, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insur­
ance v. Russell,66 involved a woman who was temporarily denied disa­
bility benefits due to a dispute with her disability i nsurer over the 
nature of her illness. While h e r  benefits were eventually restored, 
62. ERISA actually contemplates two forms of preemptio n :  complete preemp­
tion under § 502 and conflict preemption under § 514. See, e.g. , Roark v. Humana, 
Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2002 ) ;  Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 1 72 
F.3d 332, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1 999) . Although this distinction is important to ERISA 
litigation, further discussion is beyond the scope of this article. 
63. 471 U.S. 724 ( 1985) .  
64. Id. at 744. 
65. Id. at 724 ("We are aware that our decision results i n  a distinction between 
insured and uninsured plans, leavin g  the former open to indirect regulation while 
the latter are not. By so doing we merely give life to a distinction created by Con­
gress in the ' deemer clause, '  a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has 
chosen n o t  to alter.") . 
66. 473 U.S. 1 34 ( 1985 ) .  
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she sued the plan fiduciary for damages arising from the per.iod 
during which the benefits were stopped, ar�ing that th: fiduoary 
breached its duty to her by conducting an improper review of her 
medical condition. The Supreme Court held that the duty of the 
plan's fiduciary ran to the plan, not to the insureds, and thus ERISA 
preempted the plaintiffs claim for money damages from the plan 
fiduciary.67 
Russell is a pivotal case in medical ERISAjurisprudence , and its 
holding was extended in subsequent cases to ban money damages 
for prospective utilization review.68 After Russell, many assumed 
that states could not individually re gulate an ERISA MCO's pro­
spective utilization review. Unfortunately, prospective utilization 
can be easily manipulated by creating incentives for physicians to 
misclassify a patient's conditions so that expensive care is  not classi­
fied as medically necessary under the plan's guidelines.69 Such in­
centives became commonplace because MCOs are not required to 
disclose provider incentive packages ,70 and because physicians had 
little power to bargain over these incentives once MCOs captured a 
majority of insured lives where the physician practiced.71 
Similarly, Russell's holding on the nature of allowable d amages, 
while technically correct, created havoc. ERISA only contemplates 
equitable relief as it is defined within the statute,12 through lan­
guage that has increasingly been interpreted as referring only to 
such "categories of relief' as "injunction [s] , mandamus, and restitu-
67. Id. at 140-44. 
68. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
69. For example, a CT scan is generally not medically indicated for head­
aches. Thus, a prospective utilization review decision that denies a head CT scan 
as � benefit unless the headache is severe/acute or else persistent is entirely appro­
pn�te. But, if t�e HMO provides incentives for a physician not to properly take 
nou�e d1at a patient's headache is severe/acute or persistent so as to cut its cost for 
prond1?g tr�a���nt, the HMO is abusing the utilization review as a method to 
determine ehg1b1hty for benefits. See, e.g. ,  Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 
958 F. Supp. 1 1 37, 1 1 39-40 (E.D.Va. 1997) . 
70. Pete_r�on v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 2000 WL 1 708787, at *7 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 1 5  .. 2000) (fa1lmg t� find in the Third Circuit any " 'ringing endorsement' of such a umver�al , .auto�auc d�ty upon all HMOs to disclose every aspect of their physician fina�cial. mcenuves wnhout a request from the participant or without any other spe�1al c1�cumstan�e") ; Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 493 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
RICO claim for failure to disclose) .  
7 1 .  Under such situations, i t  is financially impossible for physicians to refuse 
to deal with the MCO. 
s 1 .7.2· .  Employee R�ti
_
rement
.
Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a) ( 3) ,  29 U.S.C. 
� L �2�·1)
.(�) (authonzmg parties to seek injunctions or "other appropriate equita­ble n:hef as necessary) . 
�00·1 I ERIS:\ PREE\I PTIO'.\: I :\  �l:\\::\C ;1·:D C :..\RE :w t 
tion,  but  not compe nsa tory damages . . .  _ " 7:1 O n  t h e  o t h er hand,  a 
breach of con tract action, as i n  Hu.'i.\f'!/, is '"quin tessen t ially a n  ac­
tion at law . '  " 7 1 and can not b(' c h a ract erized un der ERISA as "an 
i 1tj u n ction to com pel t h e  payme n t  of l llOIH'Y past du(' un dc:r a con­
tract, or spec ifi c performance: of a past d ue mo nc: tary o bl iga t ion . " 7,-. 
Russell's  engraftment of pension p lan-style analysi s  onto a n  in­
vestigation i n to health plan adm i n is trative malfeasance re mains the 
standard legal approach to such issues, even though the calculus 
often produces perverse outcoines. 71; These perverse legal out­
comes were made worse where participants in non-E RISA MC:Os 
were able to recover damages if th eir plan's prospec tive utilization 
review process wrongfully denied care.n The presum p tion that 
prospective util ization review was protected under ERISA provided 
ERISA HMOs with a competitive advan tage in the m arketplace, 
thereby fostering the developme n t  of many other forms of man­
aged care products.78 
In short, Metropolitan Life and Russell preven t  states from either 
defining minimal benefits or regulating prospective utilization re­
view of ERISA qualified H MOs, and p laintiffs' attorneys have had 
only mixed success in re-characterizing prospective u ti lization re­
view as medical malpractice. 79 The problem with re-characterizing 
73. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs. ,  508 U.S. 248, 256 ( 1 993) . 
74. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. '  H ealth & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 2 1 3  F.3d 
398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) ("A claim for money due and owing under a con tract is 
'quintessentially an action at law."') (citing Hudson View II  Assoc. v. Gooden, 644 
N.Y.S.2d 5 1 2, 5 1 6  (App. Div. 1996) ) .  
75. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 2 1 0-1 1 
(2002) .  
76. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1 32 1 ,  1 324, 
1337-38 (5th Cir. 1992) (ERISA preemption precludes emotional distress claim 
for parents whose unborn child died as a result of employee disability plan 's use of 
prospective utilization review) . 
77. See, e.g. , Fox v. Health Net, 1 99 3  WL 794305 (Cal. Super. Ct., Riverside 
Cty., Dec. 23, 1 993)  (state court jury awarded $89,128, 153 in damages, including 
punitive damages, against a plan that delayed the patient's receipt of what was 
considered at the time to be an experimen tal treatment) . 
78. MCOs i nclude other types of organizations, such as Preferred Provider 
Organizations ( PPOs) . There are many distinctions between PPOs and HMOs: for 
example, HMOs wield much greater control over the health care providers that 
are available to patients. HMOs are discussed i n  greater detail in this article be­
cause they provide the clearest examples. 
79.  Co mpare State Bd. of Reg. for the Healing Arts v. Fallo n ,  41 S.W.3d 474, 
�7?-77 (Mo. 2 00 1 )  (finding that MCO medical director's decision to override phy­
sician's medical decision was not entitled to ERISA preemptio n ) ,  and Murphy v. 
Bd: of Med. Exam 'rs, 949 P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 998) (finding that review by insurance company employee of physician's medical decisions is itself a medical 
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an administrative malfeasance action predicated on prospective 
utilization review as a medical malpractice action80 is that  state tort 
law can be viewed as a form of state regulation81 related to E RISA. 
Specifically, this created the perception that ERISA h ealth plans 
were beyond state statutory and common law, leading ERISA M COs 
to conclude that they could deny care without fear of subsequent 
litigation (provided that the plan itself was not delivering medical 
services, so as to open the door to a potential vicarious liability ac­
tion) .82 Early ERISA MCOs had an additional financial edge be­
cause they did not need to acquire insurance for either malpractice 
or omissions and errors related to medical care.83 Accordingly, a 
number of MCOs regularly denied medical care to patients under 
the assumption that they could not  be found liable for a wrongful 
decision. 
III.  
THE END OF ERISA PREEMPTION 
Soon, there began to be horror stories of MCOs ordering 
mothers out of the hospital within twenty-four hours of delivering a 
child, or middle-age males with atypical chest pain undergoing car­
diac arrest after their MCOs refused to authorize appropriate medi­
cal workups.84 Although it took the Supreme Court over fifteen 
years af�er Rus�ell to revisit its medical ERISA jurisprudence, the 
Court did so with a vengeance in a series of three cases. 
decision, rather than an insurance decision ) ,  with United Healthcare I ns. Co. v. 
Levy. 1 1 4 F.
_ 
S�p�. 2d 55?• . 564 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that medical board's attempt to dtsClplme phys1c1an based on coverage decision was preempted by ER­
ISA as de facto attempt by state to mandate benefits) . 
. . 
80. Dukes v. 
_
D.S. Healt?c�re, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 351-52 ( 1 99 5 )  (successfully 
stating such a claim and avo1dmg ERISA preemption) . 
� l.' See, e.g. , Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 ( 1 992) (char­actenzmg
_ 
certain health-related state laws as preempted regulation) .  
82. See, e.g. , Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlan tic States, 
In�., 958 F.Sup.
p. 1.1 37, 1 1 49-50 (E.D. Va. 1 997) ( refusing to grant motion to dis-miss claim of v1canous Iiab1'l 'ty · MCO h 
· 
. 1 against , w ere there was an agency relat1on-ship between the MCO and an allegedly negligent physician).  
83. Su Quality Chasm, supra note 1 4, at 279. 
,
84. SeP, e.g., In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc. , 193 F.3d 1 5 1 ,  1 56 (3d Cir. 1 999) (MC .O rule encouraged discharge of moth e r  and child from hospital within 
�,�.��g-���\r �tours o_f birt�) ;  Shea v. Esensten, 1 07 F.3d 625, 626 (8th Cir. 1 997) 
s r ; ,  .
. ai e to r�ler patient to heart specialist despite a number of symptoms 
· uggt su ng heart d isease, resulting in patient's death several months later) .  
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The first Supreme Court medical ERISA case after Russell was 
Pegram v. Herdrich.85 After Cynthia Herdrich had recovered from 
an appendectomy, she brought suit against her MCO for wrongful 
denial of care, alleging that her MCO had breached its fiduciary 
duties to her by denying autho rization for the appendectomy for 
over a week, thereby complicating her recovery. The MCO re­
sponded that because it was an ERISA-qualified plan, ERISA pre­
empted state review of its prospective utilization review decision to 
deny authorization of the appendectomy. Justice Souter's unani­
mous opin ion narrowly defined the ERISA health plan: 
Thus, when employers contract with an HMO to provide bene­
fits to employees subject to E RISA, the provisions of docu­
ments that set up the HMO are not, as such, an ERISA plan; 
but the agreement between an HMO and an employer who 
pays the premiums may, as h ere, provide elements of a plan by 
setting out rules under which beneficiaries will be entitled to 
care.86 
Still, even under a narrow definition of an ERISA plan, prospective 
utilizatio n  review, because it  defines eligibility for benefits, is re­
lated to the plan. In this case,  as  in most cases of MCO administra­
tive malfe asance, a physician ' s  judgment was potentially corrupted 
by the MCO's financial incentive package-e.g. , if Dr. Pegram de­
nied needed medical care to enough patients, she would receive a 
bonus.87 In a non-ERISA MCO, there is a check against prospective 
utilization review abuse: the threat of a medical malpractice action 
against both the physician and the MCO. Pegram did nothing to 
curb physician financial incentive packages; to the contrary, the Su­
preme Court specifically indicated that prospective utilization re­
view and physician incentive plans were integral components of an 
ERISA MCO because they were necessary to control health care 
costs. 
Pegram did, however, create a set of rules that can be used to 
identify when an ERISA MCO is abusing-by any m e chanism-the 
prospective utilization review process. According to Justice Souter, 
an ERISA MCO can make only three types of decisions concerning 
85. 530 U.S. 2 1 1  (2000 ) .  
86. Id. a t  223. 
87. Prior to this case, the plaintiff's bar had, at the appellate level, been chip­
ping away at the ERISA preemptive shield of prospective utilization review using a 
theory that the MCO had breached either its statutory or common law fiduciary 
duties to the patient-beneficiary. See alw McLean & Richards, supra note 22, at 12. 
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beneficiaries: ( 1) a pure eligibility decision; (2) a pure medical 
treatment decision; or (3) a mixed eligibility-medical decision.88 Ar; 
it has done since the time of Metropolitan Life, the Court held that 
where an MCO makes a pure eligibility decision-whether the plan 
provides coverage for the treatment r egardless of the
.
patient's m
.
ed­
ical condition-that decision is entitled to preemption protect10n 
from state law because the decision is related to the plan.89 The 
characteristics of a pure eligibility decision are that the decision is 
categorical, applicable to all beneficiaries, and one that can be an­
swered "yes" o r  "no" without any patient-specific information. 
On the other hand, if any part of the MCO decisio n  involves a 
medical decision-a decision that required patient-specific knowl­
edge-the decision must be characterized as either a mixed eligibil­
ity /treatment decision or a pure medical treatment decision. From 
a practical point of view, it does not matter whether the MCO's 
decision is deemed a mixed eligibility treatment decision or a pure 
medical decision: both decisions are unrelated to ERISA plans and 
therefore are not entitled to ERISA preemption protection, as they 
occur outside of the scope of ERISA. In short, when an MCO 
·makes either a mixed eligibility treatment decision or a pure medi­
cal decision, that decision is subj e ct to regulation by state law, 
rather than ERISA.90 Therefore, Pegram made it clear for the first 
time that some prospective utilizatio n  review decisions may expose 
MCOs to medical malpractice liability.91 
88. 530 U.S. at 228-30. 
89. Id. at 230 (using as an example a scenario in which the question is simply 
"whether a plan covers an undisputed case of appendicitis") ;  see Pryzbowski v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 279 (3rd Cir 200 1 ) .  
90. Id. a� 237 ("yv_e hold that mixed eligibility decisions by HMO physicians 
are not fiduciary dec1s10ns under ERISA.") . 
9 1 .  This can be seen i� subsequent cases, such as Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 
108�, 1?�6 (Pa. 2?0 1 )  (holdmg that prospective utilization review decisions involv­
ing mdlVldua.l pauent medical information are mixed processes not entitled to ER­lSA preemption ) ·  .Mor�o�e.r, c.ases decided subsequent to Pegram suggest that the threshold for findmg hab1hty 1s lower when denial of care is determined by the 
party respo�sible for p_
a�en�'. See Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 250 (3d Cir. 
2000) (findm� potenu�l hab1hty where financial incentives may affect the quality, 
r�ther �han simply existence, of care provided by MCO employees) ; Berger v. 
�v��gnn F�und. ,  2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3832, * 1 1-*12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2000) ( .a1 mg .to �nd complete preemption where MCO referred patient to program 
wnh whICh 1t had financial d 1. d h' · . ea mgs, an w ICh proved unsuccessful at treatmg pauei:t's �ondition) · But see HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Employers Health 
�11��. ,co. , 2�� F.3d �82, l ?O� � -38 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2 00 1 )  (suggesting that Pegram's rules 
' I P Y only 1t. 
there is bodily IIlJUry clearly e ligible for treatment) · Rubin-Schneider­man '" Ment Behavioral Care Corp. ,  1 63 F. Supp. 2d 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2001 ) 
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From a regulatory point of view, although Pegram made it clear 
that MCOs could no longer e ngage in prospective utilization review 
with impunity, the case also p oints out a way for MCOs to obtain 
freedom from liability for their decisions. Specifically, to the extent 
that MCOs can shift the responsibility for making mixed decisions 
and pure m edical care decisions to independent physicians, they 
may be able to avoid liability.92 This explains why, in the wake of 
Pegram, some MCOs started advertising that they were leaving medi­
cal decisions to doctors-MCOs were not giving d octors a blank 
check; they were merely shiftin g  their means of control over medi­
cal decisionmaking from direct review to the implementation of in­
direct financial incentives. Pegram recognized that ERISA 
contemplates that MCOs will try to reduce the cost of medical care, 
and that they may use incentives to achieve such cost reductions. 
Many MCOs used "hold-back" pools, which retained a certain frac­
tion of the payments due to their plan physicians, and paid the re­
tained funds only if an end-of-year audit showed that physicians had 
met the plan's goals for limiting medical care expenses. In addition 
to financ ial incentives designe d  to reward physicians who met cost 
control goals, MCOs also used economic credentialing to remove 
physicians from their rolls who consistently missed their cost con­
trol targets. 
States recognized these attempts to influenc e  physician deci­
sionmaking without triggerin g  the Pegram factors that subject plans 
to liability, and they sought to prospectively regulate medical deci­
sions made by MCOs. Rather than having plaintiffs ' lawyers sue to 
overturn individual denial-of-care decisions, a more efficient system 
would provide states with a safe harbor to regulate the impact of 
MCO incentives on medical decisionmaking. That is, a more effi­
cient state regulatory system for MCOs would involve a bright-line 
test demarcating ERISA's preemptive shield of prospective utiliza­
tion review. If the state regulated within the boundaries of the safe 
harbor, ERISA preemption would not be an issue. Not surprisingly, 
states increasingly tried to regulate prospective utilization review 
under ERISA's saving clause,93 a safe harbor to ERISA preemption. 
(finding Pegram inapplicable to a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO),  al­
though it "features aspects of an HMO" ) .  
92. See Rubin-Schneiderman, 1 63 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (suggesting that claims 
are not preempted only because MCO acts as both medical provider and 
decisionmaker) . 
93. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 5 14(b) (2) (A) , 29 
U.S.C. § 1 1 44 (b) (2) (A) ("saving" state laws regulating insurance from preemption 
by ERISA) . 
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The next ERJSA Supreme Court case examined whether such a law 
could circumvent ERISA preemption. 
B. Rush Prudential HMO v. Mora n :  Regulation fry the 
Saving Clause 
In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, the Supreme Court ex­
amined whether an insurance code regulation could be applied to 
an ERISA MC0.94 State insurance code regulations have always oc­
cupied a special niche under ERJSA. Because insurance is consid­
ered to be a traditional state function, the McCarran-Ferguso n  Act, 
which preempted federal antitrust regulation, allowed states to reg­
ulate the business of i nsurance (i .e. ,  reserve requirements, aspects 
of the business side of insurance, and the identity of those permit­
ted to buy and sell policies) . ERJSA also authorizes the states to 
regulate the business of insurance,95 through the Act's saving 
clause, which "saves"  the business of insurance, and its regulation, 
from ERISA preemption.96 Under this clause, state insurance regu­
lations are applicable to all MCOs, regardless of ERJSA status .97 
At issue in Rush Prudential HMO was whether an ERISA MCO 
had to comply with an Illinois insurance c ode regulation that man­
dated external review of adverse prospective utilization review deci­
sions, if challenged by the patient-beneficiary.98 Justice Souter, 
writing for a 5-4 majority, began his discussion by observing that a 
state regulation having "the effect of [regulating] an integral part 
of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured" is 
saved from ERJSA preemption. In Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 
the Court had ann ounced a three factor test for determining 
whether a state law regulates the business of insurance.99 Specifi-
94. 536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002) ("The issue in this case is whether the statute, as 
applied to health benefits provided by a health maintenance organization under 
contract with an employee welfare benefit plan, is preempted by [ERISA] . " ) ; see 
also Corporate Health Ins. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 2 1 5  F.3d 526, 534-35 (5th Cir. 
2000) (earlier case permitting non-malpractice forms of state regulation over 
M COs via professional organizations) . 
95. 15 u .s.c §§ 1 0 1 1 - 1 0 1 5  (2000). 
96. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1 974 § 51 4(b) (2) (A) , 29 
U.S.C. § 1 1 44(b) (2) (A) . 
97. An important limitation of the saving clause, however, is the "deemer 
clause." ERISA § 514(b) (2) (B) , 29 U.S.C. § 1 1 44 (b ) (2) (B) . The deemer clause 
prevent� a
.
self-insured ERISA
. 
plan from being deemed an insurance company and 
hence subject to state regulauon. A more detailed d iscussion of the deemer clause 
follows, infra Part I l l .D. 
98 
. •  V.f 2 1 5  ILL. COMP. STAT. 1 25/4-10 (2000 ) .  
99. 458 U .S. 1 1 9,  1 29 ( 1 982) .  
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cally, a s tate law regulates the business of insurance if the 
regulation: 
( I )  "has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's 
risk;" 
(2) "is an integral part of the policy relationship between the 
insurer and the insured;" and 
(3) "is limited to entities within the insurance industry."100 
Subsequently, the Court made it clear that a state law could regu­
late the business of insurance without all three Pireno factors being 
present. I O I  
In Rush Prudential HMO, Justice Souter found that two of the 
three Pireno factors were present. 1 02 First, the Illinois statute regu­
lated an integral part of the p olicy relationship between the insurer 
and the insured because the statute addressed how the terms of the 
insurance contract were to be interpreted. Second, because the ex­
ternal review statute was only applicable to the insurance industry, 
it was limited to entities within the insurance industry. 103 Accord­
ingly, because two out of the three Pireno factors were present, the 
Illinois statute was considered t o  regulate the business of insurance 
and was therefore saved from ERISA preemption. 1 04 
The importance of Rush Prudential HMO is that the Supreme 
Court made it clear that MCO insurance procedures, including pro­
spective utilization review, could be regulated under a state's insur­
ance code regardless of ERISA status. Although the Court had not 
budged on its position that states cannot mandate benefits, Rush 
Prudential HMO continued where Pegram left off: Pegram granted 
the states the authority to retrospectively determine whether an 
MCO wrongfully denied care on a case-by-case basis, while Rush Pru­
dential HMO extended the states '  authority to prosp e ctively regulate 
1 00. Id. 
101.  UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 373 ( 1 999) (consider­
ing "as a matter of common sense" whether a rule regulates insurance, and noting 
�hat the factors are "relevant" but not "required") . In the wake of the UNUM opin­
ion some courts adapted a "common sense" approach to the business of insurance, 
rather than applying the Pireno factor a nalysis. See, e.g. ,  Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Ins. Comm'r, 810 A.2d 425, 432-33 (Md. 2002) .  This derogation of the Pireno 
factor analysis was later addressed by the Court in Ky. Ass 'n of Health Plans. See 
discussion infra Part III.C. 
102. 536 U.S. 355, 373 (2002) . 
103. The nature of the state statute mandating external review of an HMO is 
significant. One of the key facts that distinguished Cicio v. Does, 321  F.3rd 82, 95 
<
.
2d Cir. 2003) , from Rush Prudential HMO was that the New York statute in ques­
tion in Cicio was part of the public health code. 
104. 536 U.S. at 375-87. 
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MCO medical decisionmaking. The key to this authority is that the 
state regulation must be "specifically directed toward" the insur­
ance industry if it  is to be saved from ERISA preemption. w5 
Rush Prudential HMO gives the states broad latitude to regulate 
prospective benefit decisions by regulating prospect�ve utilizat�on 
review, pointing to a major problem with state regulation: assuming 
that MCOs by their very nature are going to control costs, 106 the 
rule in Rush Prudential HMO could be used to allow states to man­
date benefits for an ERISA plan-something the Supreme Court 
has steadfastly refused to do. Hence, for treatments tha t  are not 
specifically excluded from the plan, a state can use the third party 
review process as a surrogate for a law mandating the benefit. Man­
dated benefit laws are often driven by noisy interest groups rather 
than medical science; in many cases, they mandate that plans pay 
for treatments (such as bone marrow transplants for breast cancer) 
which have not been proven to work. In other cases, the mandated 
treatment is for a social condition that has been medicalized by 
medical imperialism. Thus, Rush Prudential HMO conflicts with the 
dicta in Pegram that recognized cost-containment as a legitimate 
pursuit of an ERISA medical plan. 101 
C. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller: A New Test for the 
Business of Insurance 
The third and most recent medical ERISA Supreme Court case 
is Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans v. Miller. 1 08 While both Pegram and 
Rush Prudential HMO turn on what can best be termed m ixed eligi­
bility-treatment decisions, Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, which fo­
cuses on a state's  "any willing provider" (AWP) statute, is the first 
Supreme Court case to reach beyond medical decisionmaking to 
address factors that limit state regulation of ERISA plans.  Specifi­
cally, the statute at issue in Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans stipulated: 
"A health 
.in�urer shall not discriminate against any provider who is located withm the geographic coverage area of the health benefit 
plan and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions for partici-
1 05. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 50 ( 1 987) . 
106. In Rush Prudential HMO, the HMO was willing to pay for Ms. Moran to 
undergo th� standard operation to treat Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, but Ms. Mo­
ran wanted It to pay for an "unconventional" operation. 536 U.S. at 360. Thus, the 
facts of �ush Pnul�tial HMO are similar to those of Russell. The key distinction is 
that savmg state msurance regulations was not an issue in Russell b ecause state 
HMO regulations were still at a rudimentary stage . 
. . W7. Ru.sh Pnu/.ential HMO will also undermine efforts to improve quality of 
ca1e by plans that want to base care decisions on evidence-ba�ed medical research .  1 08. 1 23 S .  Ct. 1 471 (2003) .  
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pation established by the health insurer, including the Kentucky 
state Medicaid program and Medicaid partnerships."109 The MCO 
industry frowns upon such AWP statutes because they frustrate 
MCOs' ability to control the cost and the quality of health care ser­
vice, sinc e  the statutes require an MCO to contract with cost-ineffi­
cient and potentially incompetent providers. Both the trial and 
appellate courts found that Kentucky's AWP statute was related to 
the ERISA health plans. However, following the lead of the Su­
preme C ourt in Rush Prudential HMO, the Sixth Circuit ruled that 
Kentucky's AWP statute regulated the business of insurance and was 
therefore saved from ERISA preemption.110 The insurer then 
appealed. 
Justice Scalia began the analysis of a unanimous Court by con­
sidering the MCOs' argument that the AWP statute could not be 
protected from ERISA preemption by the saving clause because 
AWP statutes are not "specifically directed toward" the insurance 
industry as required by Pilot Life. 1 1 1  The MCOs argued that AWP 
statutes were directed at health care providers, and placed in Ken­
tucky's insurance code only as an end-run around ERISA preemp­
tion. In support of this position, the MCOs cited Group Life & 
Health Insurance v. Royal Drug for the proposition that if agreements 
between insurers and third parties can be seen as outside of the 
"business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, then 
regulation of similar agreements should not be saved from ERISA 
preemption under § 2 (b) of the Act. 1 12 The Court rejected this ar­
gument and found that the AWP statute did not impose "any 
prohibitions or requirements o n  health-care providers," 1 1 3  and ac­
cordingly did not regulate the industry. Moreover, even when a 
state law affects parties outside the insurance industry, it does not 
automatically follow that a state law is not specifically directed at the 
insuranc e  industry: "Regulations 'directed toward' certain entities 
109. Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.l 7A-270 (Michie 200 1 ) .  
1 10. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 372 (6th Cir. 2000) .  
1 1 1 . 1 23 S. Ct. at 1475. 
1 1 2. Id. at 1 476-77; see also Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 
205, 232 n.40 ( 1 979) (claiming that there would be no "principled basis" for distin­
guishing between direct and indirect effects) . 
1 1 3.  1 23 S. Ct. at 1475. The Court also noted that Royal Drug did not involve 
a state law regulating the agreements in question but the private agreements them­
selves, and that it was therefore unhelpful as precedent for purposes of ERISA. Id. 
at 1475-76 ("ERISA's savings clause, however, is not concerned (as is the McCar­
ran-Ferguson Act provision) with how to characterize condurt undertaken by pri­
vate actors, but with how to characterize state laws in regard to what thev 
'regulate."') . 
· ' 
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will almost always disable other entities from doing, with the regu­
lated entities, what the regulations forbid; this does not, suffic� to place such regulation outside the scope of ERISA s savings 
clause."1 14 
Justice Scalia's summary dismissal of the "directed toward" lan­
guage argument of the MCO, and the Court's narrow construction 
of the saving clause, suggests that the Supreme Court does not want 
saving clause litigation to generate a torrent of li�iga�ion in a m.an­ner analogous to that which followed the expansive mterpretauon 
of the preemption clause's "related to" language. 
The Court next examined the Pireno factor that it had avoided 
in Rush Prudential HMO: the "risk pool." According to the Court, 
an "AWP prohibition substantially affects the type of risk pooling 
arrangements that insurers may offer," 1 15 implying tha t  such stat­
utes regulate the business of insurance. However, Justice Scalia ob­
served that the Court's prior cases concerning the saving clause 
turned "to varying degrees, on our cases interpreting §§ 2 (a) and 
2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act," noting that this reliance was 
misdirected because it "failed to provide clear guidance to lower 
federal courts, and, as this case demonstrates, added little to the 
relevant analysis. That is unsurprising, since the statutory language 
of � l 1 44 (b) (2) (A) differs substantially from that of the McCarran­
Ferguson Act." 1 1 6 Rather than being concerned with h e alth care 
and benefits , Justice Scalia opined, the focus of the McCarran-Fer­
guson Act was limited to issues of antitrust and litigation conducted 
"by private actors, not state laws." 1 1 7 The Court also acknowledged 
that its holdings in UNUM and Rush Prudential HMO, both of which 
were predicated on McCarran-Ferguson analysis, were problematic 
because they did not specify how many Perino factors had to be pre­
sen�, or the relative weight of the factors. 1 l H Accordingly, Kentucky 
Ass n of Health Plans held that it would " make a clean break from 
the McCarran-Ferguson factors" for interpretation of the saving 
1 1-1 .  Id. at 1 476. 
I I :>. Id. at 1 478. 
1 1 6. Id. 
1 1 7. Id. 
. . 
l I H._ Id. ( "Our holdings in UNUM a n d  Rush Prudential-that a state law may �·ul the hrs
,
t McCarra.n-Ferguson factor yet still be saved from pre-emption under � l 1_ �4 (b) (2)
.
(A)-ra1se more questions than they answer and provide wide oppor­t�1111t�es for divergent outcom:s. May a state law satisfy any two of the three McCar-1 ·'.11-F�rgl�son fac�ors an? still fall under the savings clause? Just one? What l_1•1P.r_rns .  '' two of three
. 
factors are satisfied, but not 'securely satisfied' or 'clearly s.1t1sht·d. as they were m UNUM and Rush Pnul.entiaP."). 
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clause of ERISA. 1 19 The court then announced a new two-prong 
test for whether a state law is to be deemed a law that "regulates 
insurance": " [£] irst, the state law must be specifically directed to­
ward entities engaged in insurance," and second, "the state law 
must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the 
insurer and the insured." 1 20 Because "Kentucky's law satisfies each 
of these requirements," it was saved from ERISA p r eemption.121  
D. Caveat: The Deemer Clause 
ERISA's deemer clause prohibits a state from d eeming that a 
self-funded ERISA plan is an insurer subject to state regulation 
under the saving clause. 122 The ERISA saving clause ,  which was the 
subject of both Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health 
Plans, and which allows states to regulate plans, is  limited by the 
deemer clause, which says tha t  if a plan is purely s elf-funded, then 
the saving clause does not apply. The key to understanding the 
deemer clause is remembering that Congress was thinking of pen­
sion plans, not health plans, when it wrote ERISA. The deemer 
clause says that although a self-funded and administered pension 
plan is doing something that looks like what an insurance company 
does, this does not make it an insurance company. For example, 
while pensions take special expertise to administer, the expertise 
required is the same sort of financial expertise that many corpora­
tions use in their core businesses. Indeed, it is not unusual for a 
company to fund and run its own pension plan. Such a plan invests 
its reserves and pays benefits, closely resembling involvement in the 
business of insurance. Without the deemer clause, these plans 
would be subject to state regulation because they do the same busi­
ness as insurance companies. 
The deemer clause is more complicated for health plans be­
cause employers cannot run health plans internally in the way that 
they can run pension plans. Administration of a health plan re­
quires knowledge of medicine and the services of many health care 
providers, something that is outside the usual busin ess expertise. 1 23 
1 19. Id. at 1 479. 
1 20. Id. 
1 2 1 .  Id. 
1 22. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1 974 § 5 1 4 (b) (2) (B),  29 
U.S.C. § 1 1 44 (b) (2) (B) ;  spe also, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 ( 1990) 
("We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws 
that 'regulat[e]  insurance' within the meaning of the saving clause.") . 
1 23. Almost all states banned the corporate practice of medicine when ER ISA 
was written .  These bans generally prevented physicians from being employed by 
non-physicians, so that employers that wanted to retain physi cians to provide gen-
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While a health plan may be completely self-funded,
. 
it is almost 
never run exclusively by the employer. Rush Prudential HMO and 
Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans involved em
p
loyers whose 
�
l�ns were 
run by external companies, called third party adm1mstrators 
(TPAs) .  The opinions in both decisions contained footnotes refer­
ring to the deemer clause. In Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, the 
Court stated, "The deemer clause presents no obstacle to Ken­
tucky's law, which reaches only those employee benefit plans 'not 
exempt from state regulation by ERISA . . . . "' 124 Similarly, the 
Court in Rush Prudential HMO stated, "111inois 's Act would not be 
'saved' as an insurance law to the extent it applied to self-funded 
plans."125 Had the medical plans been pure self-funded or self-ad­
ministered plans (like pension plan s) ,  these cases would have been 
decided differently: neither plan would be subject to state regula­
tion, because the deemer clause would trump the saving clause. To 
understand how the Court's decision would be altered if these 
plans had been self-funded and self-administered, it is useful to con­
trast Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans with 
Pegram. 
In Pegram, the Court distinguished medical decisionmaking 
from decisions regarding plan benefits. Pegram draws a bright line 
by holding that individualized medical decisionmaking-making 
decisions about an individual's  care that depend on the specific 
facts of the individual's medical condition rather than o n  a gen eric 
reading of the contract of insurance-is completely outside ERISA. 
Thus neither the saving clause nor the deemer clause is relevant: 
medical decisionmaking is not covered by ERISA, and i t  does not 
matter how a plan is structured or administered. In c o ntrast, al­
though the statutes at issue in Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky 
Ass 'n of Health Plans affected how plan administrators make deci­
s�ons that are within the ambit of ERISA, both statutes were permis­
sible because the saving clause allows states to regulate plans 
involving the business of insurance . 1 2° 
The difficult question, and one that has not been directly an­
swered by courts or the ERISA statute, is how much of a health 
eral
. 
care to employees would have had to treat them as independent contractors. 
While a company could employ a physician as medical director to administer a 
�ealth plan, th� �ori;>orat�on would then be exposed to medical malpractice liabil­
ity for the physician s actions and omissions. 
124. 1 23 S.Ct. at 1 476 n. l .  
125. 536 U.S. 355, 371 n.6 (2002) . 
1 26. The key difference between Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n of HPnith Plam is that the latter refines the definition of "business of insurance" so as 
to clear up some of the ambiguities created by UNUM. 
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plan's operations can be con tracted out before the deemer clause 
no longer blocks state regulation. As an example, assume that an 
employer sets up a self-insured health plan and runs it directly, per­
haps as Kaiser did in the 1930s. The employer contracts with physi­
cians to provide care, sets the terms of the care, but makes no 
medical decisions. While the self-funded employer is providing 
both medical and insurance services, in a manner analogous to an 
HMO, the deemer clause prevents the state from declaring the em­
ployer's plan an insurance company subject to s tate regulation. 
This is consistent with the purpose of ERISA, which was to create a 
special legal niche protecting self-funded health and pension plans. 
In contrast, while large employers may have enough employees 
to justify running a plan in-house, few do it because of the complex­
ity (created by the need to have medical expertise and providers) of 
running an MCO system. Running a plan entirely in-house also 
limits the options for managing care: if the employer starts making 
medical-necessity decisions, Pegram will allow the beneficiaries to 
sue the employer in its role as plan administrator for medical mal­
practice. No employer wants the potential legal liability and bad 
publicity that such state court claims would bring, given that there 
are n o  rep o rted cases in which a court found that a health plan with 
a TPA was governed by the deemer clause. 1 27 
If the e mployer does not give the third party administrator any 
medical discretion in the administration of benefits, then the 
deemer clause would logically extend to the administrator. Given 
the cost of health care claims, however, it would be expected that 
the employer would want the administrator to have both the au­
thority and the duty to find ways to ensure that the care was pro­
vided in a cost effective manner. The more authority the employer 
gives the administrator, the less l ikely the deemer clause will apply. 
The right to make medical-ne cessity decisions, as was at issue in 
Rush Prudential HMO, would be another powerful reason for the 
courts to fina that the administrator was outside the deemer clause. 
Moreover, because Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans found that an AWP 
law affected risk sharing, it could also be argued that an administra­
tor who sets up a physician panel rather than letting patients seek 
care from any physicians they wanted is outside the deemer clause 
because i t  i s  acting as an insurer. 
1 27. See, e.g. ,  Marks v. Watters, 322 F.3d 3 1 6, 323, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2003) 
<
.
finding that claims against administrative actor making only non-medical deci­
sions were appropriately removed to fede ral court under ERISA § 502 rather than 
through § 5 1 4  analysis) . 
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In short, because health plans are distinctly different from pen­
sion plans, it is impossible to predict the real impact of the deemer 
clause in health plan regulation. T h e  language about the deemer 
clause in Rush Prudential HMO, Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, and 
other health plan cases is dicta. It is impossible to tell from the case 
record whether the court is going to be strict about its standards for 
applying the deemer clause, or whe ther the nature of healt� �lans 
causes employers to contract out so much of the plan adm1mstra­
tion that the deemer clause is irrelevant. Clear financial benefits 
result when an expert TPA administers a self-insured health plan 
lacking comparable i nternal expertise.  M oreover, in hiring a T�A, 
a self-insured plan would insulate itself from exposure to medical 
malpractice claims. The price of the third party administration of 
the plan would be that the decisionmaking that is delegated to the 
TPA becomes subject to state insurance code regulation. If a court 
were to attemp t  to extend deemer clause protection to third-party 
administrator actions that are dictated by the plan (i.e.,  to decisions 
where the third-party administrato r  has no discretion) , the court 
will be faced with a line-drawing issue analogous to the "related to" 
problem that has plagued ERISA p reemption. 
E. Implications: MCOs Face Increased Exposure 
Collectively, Pegram, Rush Prudential HMO, and Kentucky Ass 'n of 
Health Plans increase liability exposure for MCOs when they engage 
in medical decisionmaking. In the days before Pegram, MCO medi­
cal directors routinely second-guessed treating physicians and made 
de facto medical decisions under the guise of prospective utilization 
review without the MCO acquiring any liability. Given that there 
was little downside at that time to denyin g  medical care, MCOs op­
erated in an environment where strong incentives existed to deny 
even necessary medical care. Thus, while horror stories of the con­
sequences of under-prescription of medical care occasionally 
�eak�d into the press and written a p pellate opinion, what is surpris­
mg 1s that there were not more. 
Pegr�m, however, made it clear that if medical care was wrong­
fully demed by prospective utilization review, and if a medical deci­
sion was involved ,  that decision was subject to judicial review. After 
Pe�am, when ai:i MCO either intentionally or negligently harmed a 
pat
.
1ent, the patlent could sue the m edical director for malpractice. 
This meant that the MCO accrued liability for medical decisions 
made by its �edical director under respondeat superior theory. Thus, 
�or the first yme, E�SA MCOs needed to contemplate e ither giv­
ing up medICal dec1s1onmaking power or purchasing medical mal-
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practice insurance. Given the huge awards in cases brought 
successfully against non-ERISA M COs, managing medical decisions 
would h ave to be very cost-effective to be worth doing under 
Pegram. Many plans had already begun to question the effectiveness 
of prospective utilization review before Pegram because it is very 
costly to do-Pegram just provided one more powerful incentive to 
shift to different cost-control strategies. 1 28 Rush Prudential HMO 
and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans further undermined the ability of 
MCOs to control care through plan-driven strategies to manage 
medical decisionmak.ing, in that they confirm tha t  the state may 
regulate some aspects of ERISA health plans. 
Allowing the states to regulate MCO medical decisionmaking 
under their  insurance codes a n d  their tort laws creates an interest­
ing situa tion. Arguably, each state could set its own quality stan­
dards, which would thereby defeat an express purpose for enacting 
ERISA: to provide national employers with a uniform set of laws to 
govern the administration of employee health plans. Wealthy 
states, or those with powerful plaintiffs' lawyer lobbies, could set the 
quality-of-health-care bar higher than less-endowed states that can­
not afford equally luxuriant medical care. 1�9 Such a crazy quilt of 
health care regulations would increase the cost of health insurance 
in national plans, in addition to defeating this express purpose of 
ERISA. Thus, we soon may see national businesses and labor un­
ions lobbying Congress to provide a unified set of health care regu­
lations as ERISA is undermined by the courts . 130 
128. A recent Aetna settlemen t  agreement is a good example of such alterna­
tive cost-control strategies. Settl.ement Agreement (May 2 1 ,  2003 ) , availabl.e at http:/ I 
www.aetna.com/Iegal_issues/pdf_documents/settlement.pdf (on file with the 
NYU Annual Survey of American Law) . 
1 29. To some extent this is already happening. Louisiana,  a poor state, has 
the nation ' s  most draconian tort reform laws, putting very stringent limits on medi­
cal malprac tice awards. Whether this is cause or effect is hard to say, but the qual­
ity of care i n  many of Louisiana's charity hospitals is very low. 
130.  Even before Justice Scalia's  opinion in Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans was 
handed down, America had become increasingly concerned over the rising cost of 
health insurance. See, e.g., David Stires, The Breaking Point, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003, 
at 104-08. Given the current cost of health insurance, many e mployers can no 
longer afford to provide such coverage as a benefit. Consequently, between 2001 
and 2002, nearly four out of five individuals without health i nsurance were em­
ployed or actively looking for employment. FAMILIES USA, GotNC WITHOUT 
HEALTH INSURANCE: NEARLY ONE 1N THREE NoN-Et.oERLY AMERICANS 5 (Mar. 2003) ,  
available a t  http://www.familiesusa.org/site/ DocServer/Going_without_repon. 
pdf?docl0=273) (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law ) .  Kentucky 
Ass'n of Health Plans will likely aggravate this situation. 
· 
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N. 
THE FUTURE OF THE HEAL TH 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
A. Health Insurance After Pegram, Rush Prudential HMO, and 
Kentucky Ass'n  of Health Plans 
At the time of its introduction, managed care was a logical re­
action to rampant medical inflation that was driven by the nexus of 
fee-for-service medicine and the medical imperialism model of 
care. Before the limitations and p erverse consequences of man­
aged care dominated the public discourse, there were grave c�n­
cerns about the unintended consequences of fee-for-service 
medicine: these included unnecessary surgery, unneeded and even 
dangerous drug prescriptions, ever more splintered medical care 
driven by super-specialization, increasing lengths of hospital stays 
with rising levels of iatrogenic injuries, and most critically, rapidly 
rising costs that were seen as unsupportable. Managed care, in its 
initial form of closed-panel HMOs with one-stop shopping for med­
ical care, theoretically offered better-coordinated care, the elimina­
tion of unnecessary and dangerous care, more patient convenience 
(achieved by offering more services in the office) , and better qual­
ity of care ( through modern management) . To a great extent, 
these promises were fulfilled, and patients in these e arly HMOs 
(such as Kaiser in California) were very satisfied with their care. 
As cost control became an issue in the 1970s and 1980s, these 
early HMOs, which had not marketed themselves as m oney-saving 
entities, shifted their marketing and organization to use their ad­
ministrative structures to cut costs. They were soon joined by many 
other forms of managed care, all seeking to control costs by con­
trolling medical decisionmaking. 13 1  Unfortunately, while there was 
mo1:ey to be saved by reducing the charges for services, and by re­
ducmg unnecessarily expensive services or unneeded services, it is 
often difficult to determine what can be cut without harm and what 
is a necessary service. Physicians who uncritically ordered unneces­
sary tests and procedures under FFS did not have the skills or 
clinical information to make good decisions about tests and proce­
�ures that could be eliminated under managed care. More troub­
lmgly: as the c ourts recognized ERISA preemption of both state tort law�u.1ts and .state regulation dealing with MCO control of medical dec1s1onmakmg, ERISA MCOs became more ruthless in  their cost 
cutting and less concerned about the quality of care. This was exac-
. 
1 3 1 . S1'f Richards & McLean, su/Jra note 1 5, at 447 (noting that the rise of M< .Os paralleled the generally "rising cost of health care") . 
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erbated by economic factors: many MCOs did not make money and 
employed ever more desperate strategies to cut costs. 132 
In response to this situation,  patients, plaintiffs'  lawyers, and 
state regulators pushed the courts to rethink ERISA preemption. 
This push was also supported by physicians, who took the brunt of 
the legal fallout from ERISA p reemption. Even into the late 1990s, 
while the courts were holding that ERISA plans could not be sued 
for interfering with medical decisionmaking, treati n g  p hysicians en­
joyed no preemption and were the sole available targets of plain­
tiffs' ire. 133 Thus, while p hysicians were forced to deliver lower 
quality care or risk losing their jobs or contracts with the insurer, 
they could not use the insurer's policies as a defense when they 
were sued for medical malpractice. 134 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court responded to these concerns 
with its Pegram, Rush Prudential HMO, and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health 
Plans decisions. These cases carved out regulation of medical deci­
sionmaking from ERISA preemption (at least, for plans run by 
third party insurers not covered by the deemer clause ) . 135 Plans 
that continue to directly control medical decisionmaking are sub­
ject to tort lawsuits and to state regulation of their decisions. How-
ever, Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans also 
undermined the Court's recognition in Pegram that cost control is 
not an i llegitimate goal of managed care, and may be necessary if 
health care is going to be broadly available. 136 One can argue that 
Pegram is about malpractice and that plans should not commit mal­
practice. 1 37 Even if plans are willing to accept the medical malprac­
tice risks, Rush Prudential HMO still imposes state regulatory 
controls on ERISA plans. Rush Prudential HMO itself is a good ex-
1 32. Robert Lowes, We Nailed an HMO jM $6 Million, MED. EcoN., Dec. 23, 
2002, at 60, 65-66 (stating that defunct HMOs' losses "weren 't produced by run­
away medical costs," but from "administrative costs") . 
1 33.  See Lancaster v. Kaiser Fou n d .  Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1 1 37, 1 149-50 
(E.D. Va. 1 997) (finding that medical malpractice claims against  physicians-and 
vicarious liability for insurers-are not preempted by ERISA, while direct negli­
gence claims against insurers are preempted) . 
1 34. McLean & Richards, supra note 22, at 12. 
1 35 .  The authors believe that because the excesses of managed care drove the 
U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider ERISA in Pegram, Rush Prudential HMO, and 
Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, it is u n likely that the Court will then undermine 
these cases by allowing the same excesses under plans sheltered by the deemer 
clause. 
1 36. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 2 1 1 ,  219-22 (2000) . 
1 37. Anyone familiar with medical malpractice litigation against MCOs will 
�ecognize that i t  is very difficult to defend a proper medical decision to deny care 
if a consequence of that decision is to save money. 
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ample of the problem: the plan that prompted the litigation ri&"h t­
fully, per its written policies, denied payment for an expens1v�, 
dangerous, unconventional, and unproven treatment for a condi­
tion that arguably does not require treatment at all. 1;1�fortu�ately, 
a state regulation allowed the patient to have the dec
,
1s1on �eVIewcd 
by a third party reviewer, 1 38 who overturned the plan s 
.
demal base? 
on the reviewer's own criteria for treating the pauent's cond1-
tion. 1 3Y The problem with outside review of denial-of-care decisions 
is that the reviewer has no incentive to deny care140 and every rea­
son to approve the treatment,141 as under the traditional FFS model 
of care. 
B. Rethinking the Tragic Choices 
At the beginning of this article we listed six factors that affect 
the cost of health care in the United States: 
( 1 )  health care providers offer new services, which appear to 
improve outcomes but either cost more than existing treat­
ments or have no existing analog; 
(2) demographic shifts increase the number of elderly persons 
needing medical services; 
(3) lifestyle and environmental diseases increase the number 
of persons needin g  medical services; 
( 4) heal th care providers charge more for the same services; 
1 38. Certain administrative decisions may still qualify as medical decisions 
subj ect to state review. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins.,  215 
F.3cl 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000); Murphy v .  Bd. of M e d .  Examiners, 949 P.2d 530, 536 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1 997) ; State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Fallon, 41 
S.W.3d 474, 476-77 (Mo. 2001 ) .  
1 39. The development of objective guidelines for treatment and precise defi­
nition of " medical necessity" will go a long way to eliminating Rush-type litigation. 
SPP gn1mdly Thomas R. McLean, Medical Rationing: The Implicit Result of Leadership 
by Example, 36 J. HEALTH L. 325 (2003) (discussing the "medical necessity" stan­
dard and reviewing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE: CooRDINAT­
IN(; GonRNMENT ROLES IN IMPRO'v1NG HEALTH CARE QUALITY (2002)) .  
1 40. Bone marrow transplants for advanced breast cancer are a good exam­
ple .
. 
T.hey never had good scientific backing, yet health plans were sued for not �ml\1dmg_ them and some states passed laws mandating that they be covered. Iron-
1Cally, while l
_
ater medical research has shown them to be ineffective, expensive, 
and very detnmental to the patient's quality of life ,  these state mandates are s till in 
place. 
1-t 1 :  The pla� is also subject to fraud by it� own physicians, who may manipu­
la�t '. patient
. '.11
ed1cal information to justify unnecessary treatments. See Matt 
0 ( .m�nor. I ransfJlanl Scandal Hits 3 Hospitals, CHI. TRIB. July, 29, 2003, at 1 
(<h.'sn_
1h111g how several physicians manipulated diagnoses in order to p erform 
11n1 1Hhcatccl liver transplant<;) . 
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(5 )  health care providers offer n ew sen·ices to gai n market 
share or increase profits, which ar·e more costly bu t h ave little 
benefi t O\'cr existing services, or offer unnecessal)' services; and 
(6)  more services are put unde r the medical umbrella. 
I . The Pitfalls of Legislative Reforms 
We then asked whether it is possible to sort out factors four 
and five from factors one and two, so as to avoid Professor Oren­
tlicher's tragic choices. We now return to this analysis in the light 
of the U.S. Supreme Court's restr ucturin g  of ERISA's preemption 
of state req uirements on managed care plans. Controlling factors 
four and five and distinguishin g  them from factors o n e  and two 
requires that there be some s ystem for con trolling medical 
decisionmakin g. 
Chelati o n  therapy for cardiac disease provides a good example 
of how these factors play out in the real world. Chelatio n  therapy is 
being offered by health care providers in  many communities as a 
new and miraculous treatment. However, not only is documenta­
tion of the therapy's efficacy lacking, 14� chelation therapy may be 
detrimental if used in place of effe ctive treatments, and it costs the 
health care system more than $400,000,000 a year, perhaps much 
more.143 While providers of this treatment would call it a factor 
one treatmen t-one that is valuable and must be paid for even 
though it is costly-an MCO would rightly term it a factor five-a 
worthless and c ostly treatment. Thus, the question is which classifi­
cation would prevail under the new rules of Rush Prudential HMO 
and Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans. 
The U.S .  S upreme Court's recent ERISA preemption cases 
greatly limit the ability of MCOs to control the care that is  delivered 
to their patien ts. 144 While Rush Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass 'n 
of Health Plans are ostensibly about the right of the state to regulate 
�ealth plans t o  ensure the protection of the public, their results will 
hkely be paradoxical. Rush Prudential HMO authorizes states to im­
pose administrative due process (e .g. , third-party review of the 
MCOs' decisions) on MCOs, but sets n o  standards for review. Ac­
cordingly,  MCOs' costs will rise after Rush Prudential HMO because 
�he cost of administering an HMO with cost-effective p roviders will 
in�re�se. For e xample, it is likely that an independe n t  reviewer in 
llhno1s would approve chelation therapy-the treatmen t  is some-
142. Merril L. Knudtson et. al, Chelation TherafrY for lschemic Heart Disease: A 
Randomized ControUed Trial, 287 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 481, 484 (2002). 
1 43 . Id. at 48 1 .  
144. McLean & Richards, supra note 7, at 39. 
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thing that the patient wants and that som.e physician say� is both a good idea and one that is worth p erf ormmg (the only d1scernable 
requirement for approval in Rush Prudential HM0) . 145 
. 
The fundamental problem with state regulation o f  MC�s is 
that such regulation is driven by patient and health care p rovider 
groups that seek only to deal with the denial-of-care aspects of MCO 
decisionmaking. The most common manifestations of this p roblem 
are statutory mandates for insurance coverage that are driven by 
media storms rather than good science. 146 The costs of care are 
further ratche te d  up when such mandated coverage is sometimes 
unnecessary or dangerous. 147 Prior to Rush Prudential HMO, such 
mandates did not apply to ERISA plans, unless enacted as federal 
law. However, after Rush Prudential HMO, states will b e  able to by­
pass the prohibition against mandated benefits by recasting them as 
quality-of-care mandates. This is an example of the "tragedy of the 
commons" phenomenon that afflicts most state regulation of pri­
vate health care: 1 48 the immediate individual benefit from in­
creased care is perceived to outweigh the more global problem of 
cost-of-care increases. As mandates are increased, care becomes 
more expensive and more people are excluded from coverage. 
This is not a new problem. In 1974, the federal government 
gave states regulatory power over the development of new health 
care facilities . 1 49 The centerpiece o f  this legislation was the certifi­
cate of need ( CON) process, which was intended to lower costs of 
health care by preventing the construction of new health care facili­
ties in areas where there was already adequate capacity. 1so In most 
communities, however, the citizen boards overseeing the CON pro-
1 45. In fact this is exactly what happened in Rush Prudential HMO, but rather 
than approvi�g chelation therapy, Rush Prudential HMO concerned the approval of 
a costly surgical p rocedure that the patient wanted, but that had not yet been 
demonstrated to be efficacious. 
1 46. David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: Whats Wrong With a Patient Bill 
of Right5, 73 S. CAL. L. RE.v. 221, 222-24 (2000) .  
1 47. Laws limiting insurance companies' ability to deny questionable care 
n�ay a.lso be used i� insurance fraud schemes that depend on claims being paid w1Lh little or no review. See Vanessa Furhmans, FBI Raids Surgery Clinics in Probe­
f 11t1Pst1gators Say Patients Were Paid to Have Surgery in a $300 Million Scam, WALL ST. j., 
Mar. 19,  2004, at A7. 
1 48. See generally Garrett Hardin The Tracredy oif the Commons 162 Sci 1 243 
( 1 968). 
' b ' • 
1 49. National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1 974, Pub. 
L.. No. 93-641 ,  88 Stat. 2225 ( 1976) . 
. 
1 50.
, 
See Patrick jo�
,
n McGinley, Beyond Health Care Reform: Reconsidering Certifi­
Wlf of 1\m/ Laws In a Managed Competition " System 23 Fl.A. ST. U L REv 141  
148-50 ( 1 995) .  
, 
. . . ' 
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cess did not limit construction, because they saw the value of a new 
facility in their community as ou tweighing its effect on the global 
cost of health care.  
2. The l nstil l l ll' of Medic i ne and National Standards 
The o n ly s u pportable antidote to these problematic state or 
federal insurance mandates is a national set of evidence-based 
medicine stand ards. For the past several years, the I nsti tute of 
Medicine ( I O M )  has been publis h ing reports on medical errors. 
These reports paint a grim picture o f  needless patient suffering and 
death. v\Thile these reports have been controversial and may dra­
matically overstate the consequences of medical mistakes, 1 5 1  they 
do identify a key problem in medicine-the lack of good informa­
tion on what are the best treatme n t  options for commo n  medical 
conditions. There are now maj o r  research programs in place to 
develop standard protocols for t h e  treatment of com m on medical 
conditions. While the rationale b e hind such protocols is improving 
care, it is ass u m ed that reducing costs is also a main obj ective. Such 
protocols are already available for asthma and are proven to greatly 
improve patient  care and cut costs by reducing severe complica­
tions which require hospitalization. 1 52 Applied to our chelation 
therapy example, it is clear that evidence-based clinical-care guide­
lines would i m p rove care and save money. 
The IOM envisions that these p rotocols will replace managed 
care with a system of risk managed care. 153 The key features of risk 
managed care will be increased: ( 1 )  utilization of guideline-driven 
protocols; ( 2 )  monitoring of providers' practices; and (3) financial 
mcentives to induce provider compliance with the guideline proto­
�ols. 154 As e nvisioned by the IOM, risk managed care will be an 
u�provemen t over managed care because medical decisionmaking 
will be above board and subject to increased scrutiny and scientific 
validation. This would make i t  much easier to manage factors four 
and five and t o  tell when a purportedly beneficial new treatment is 
1 5 1 .  See Troyen A .  Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors­
Could It Do Harm?, 342 NEW ENc. J. Mrn. 1 1 23 (2000) ; Clement]. McDonald et. al, 
Deaths Due to Medical Errors Are Exaggerated in Institute of Medicine Report, 284 ]. AM. 
ME.o. A<>s'N 93-94 (2000) .  
. 1 52.  McLean, supra note 139, at 329 , 355 n .40 (discussing the time-line for implementation of guideline-driven medicine to treat conditions such as asthma) . 
1 53. Implications, supra note 8, at 229. 
1 54. See McLean, supra note 139, at 327. See also INST. OF MED., To ERR 1s 
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1-15 (Linda T. Koh n  et al., eds. 
2000) (stating that the current health care system has failed consumers and sug­
gesting broad routes to improvement) . 
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really yet another unproven treatment tha t  will raise costs wit?out 
improving care. However, the IOM' s  system of health ca�e d e livery 
shares, in common with managed care, the fault that lt o�ly ad­
dresses the delivery of medical care, not the primary preven tion of 
illness.155 Because IOM's system does n o t  tackle the other causes of 
medical inflation, it will have only a limited effect as a cost con trol 
device, 1:;r. although it may be effective a t  improving quality of care 
and reducing malpractice litigation against doctors who follow the 
protocols. 
3. Prevention 
Factor three-lifestyle decisions tha t  increase illness-is the 
most important factor to manage. Lifestyle ,  perhaps more than any 
other factor, is subject  to manipulation. Changing lifestyles a n d  en­
vironmental factors to prevent the development of disease is called 
primary prevention. It is the most cost-effective way to m anage dis­
eases and also creates the greatest gains for individuals because it is 
always better to avoid developing an illness than to receive good 
treatment for it. 157 Smoking is the most important p reventable 
cause of premature death and chronic illness, and it is on the de­
cline because of decades of efforts to make it more difficult for peo­
ple to smoke. Eliminating cigarette machines, making it difficult to 
smoke at work, raising the cost of cigarettes, and other strategies 
are gradually convincing people that smoking is not worth the 
trouble. Over the next several decades, it is hoped that smoking 
will decrease to levels that will not greatly impact health care. 
Obesity is the number two preven table health risk. Obesity, 
which increases the risk from smoking and genetic predispositions 
1 55.  The IOM's publications make it clear that it is aware of the entire 
breadth of medical imperialism. We also recog nize that the IOM's techniques 
could be used to address medical imperialism issues that are beyond the control of 
health ca�e provi�ers. Still, to date, it seems that the government and the business 
commumues are interested only in IOM's recommendations to control provider 
autonomy. Whe.ther the payors of health care ado p t  effective preventive medicine t�chnology:--wh1ch leverages current assets against only potential future liabili­
ues-remams to be seen .  
1 56: However, if the I O M  does implement a n  effective preventive medicine 
system, n. would
. 
b� a substantial improvement over managed care. Moreover, to 
�h� IO
_
M s credit, 1.t has a �o�g but underappreciated track record of publishing a1 ucl�s on prevenuve med1cme. See INST. OF MED., PUBLICATION LIST, at h ttp:// 
www. 10m.edu/file.asp?id==7458 (last visited Jan. 19, 2004) (on file with the NYU Annual Sur.·ey of American Law) . 
• 
. 1_57. Die�, exerci�e ,  and eliminating smoking could dramatically reduce diabe-
t� s. �,u1�e1.' kidney disease,
_ 
and other chronic conditions that require the most 
t xpt nsl\ e and least successful treatments. 
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to heart disease and diabetes, is r is in� rapidly i n  this coun try, with 
20.9% of the populati on classified as cl i n ica lly obese, a dramatic 
i ncrease from over thirty years ago . 1 ,-,8 Obesity and i t-; m�jo r  secon­
dary complica ti o n , type II  diabetes ,  already accoun t  for significant 
health care expenditures , and these c osts will increase d ramatically 
as current trends develop through time. 
Shifting the medical care system toward preven tive medicine is 
a key part of an overall strategy to con trol factors such as smoking, 
obesity, 1 "'!1 AID S ,  gun violence, 1no and accidents, 1 0 1  a l l  o f  which in­
crease health care costs. The medical role  in prevention is called 
secondary prevention.  The best examples are hypertension treat­
ment and the careful managemen t of diabetes. Treating th ese dis­
eases, which often occur together, reduces the development of 
heart and kidney disease, blindness,  nerve damage leading to am-
158. The core cause of obesity is too much food relative to the individual's 
physical activity. There are many i�dividual genetic and metabolic factors that af­
fect the exact need for calories and exercise, but at the societal level, the problem 
is too much food and too little exercise. This is the result of two trends. First, over 
the past fifty years, the U nited States and most other developed countries have 
established farm policies that encourage the production of large amounts of cheap 
food. These policies have been wildly successful, making food cheap in historical 
terms and so abundant that it is difficult to dispose of the excess production. Gov­
ernment policy e ncouraged the consumption of more food, and individuals and 
private businesses responded with larger portion sizes and more calorically dense 
foods. 
During the same period, employme n t  and household tasks have become 
much less physically demanding, and changes in living and transportation patterns 
resulted in most people getting much less exercise in their daily lives. Schools 
all?wed children less time for play, and the shift to organized sports left out the 
children who did not have the family resources and transportation to participate in 
structured activities outside school time. Passive entertainment such as television 
and computer games became a substitute for active outside play for most children 
and young adults. 
1 59. Medical care providers have an important role in reducing smoking and 
obesity and managing diabetes to reduce long term complications and medical 
costs. Yet these are activities that pay off only in the long term, and health insur­
ance is rated and paid for on yearly cycles. Thus there is no incentive for a health 
p�an to encourage preventive care because i t  cannot recapture the ultimate savings 
Within its financial planning horizon. 
1 60. See generally Edward P. Richards, Book Review, 21 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & Mcr.n. 1 66 (2002) (considering various proposals to prevent the costly effects of gun violence) (reviewing PHILIP J. CooK &JENS Luowic, GuN V10LENCE-THE REAL 
CosTs (2000) ) .  
1 6 1 .  AIDS, gun violence, and serious accidents, especially automobile acci­
dents, are a tremendous burden on urban emergency rooms and hospitals, per­
haps the most fragile component in the health care system. 
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putation, and other tragic and expensive complications. 1 1;2 
.
These 
treatments are not expensive, but pose one of the most difficult 
problems in the U.S. health care system: ensuring that patients have 
consistent access to quality medical care. 
Chronic disease treatment is very difficult if patients cannot see 
the same physicians over time, and if those physici�ns ?o not use 
standardized care plans to ensure that the chrome diseases are 
treated in the most effective manner p ossible. 16� As employers 
change health plans, as health plans shift patients between different 
physicians based on the latest bids for services, as those same often 
over-worked physicians rush their schedules, it becomes dif�cult fo
.
r 
most patients to see their physicians on a regular basis, and impossi­
ble for diabetic patients with problems that need immediate care to 
get that care before the problems become more serious. Preven­
tion is very sensitive to inconvenience and delay because patients 
ripe for preventive care usually do not have severe enough symp­
toms to drive them to get care despite these barriers. Unfortu­
nately, although it is hard to get patients to worry about 
asymptomatic diseases such as early diabetes or hypertension, get­
ting them consistently treated in the early stage of disease is the key 
to prevention.164 Many health plans are further complicating this 
goal by shifting more of the cost of care to the insured through 
higher co-payments and up-front charges when they want to see 
their doctors. These shifts are intended to make patients better 
shoppers for health care, but they really encourage patients to not 
go to the doctor unless they are really sick. Unfortunately, this is 
the worst possible strategy for preventing the complications of 
chronic diseases. When such plans include preventive medicine 
cov�rage, s.
uch. coverage relates to patients getting a check-up, not having their diabetes or hypertension managed. 
Since preventive medicine and injury prevention require pre­
sent-da� expenditures that only save money in the longer term, 
health msurance must be restructured to have a longer financial 
. 
1 62. ·�ee The CDC Diabetes Cost-effectiveness Group, Cost-effectiveness of Jnten­
swe Glyc;mzc Control, Intensified Hypertension Control, and Serum Cholesterol Level Reduc­
tion Jo� Type 2. Diabetes, 287 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2542, 2547 (2002) . 
1 63.
, 
Chnstopher D. Saudek, Progress and Promise of Diabetes Research, 287 J. Ai"1. 
�F.D. Ass � 2582, 2583 (2002) (concluding that the "US health care system is unde­
niably built
. 
around acute, episodic illness, providing a care model that does not 
deal well Wlth chronic disease") . 
. 1
64. CD
,
C Diabetes Cost-Effectiveness Study Group, The Cost-effectiveness of 
.�mmmg fa; Type 2 Diab.
etes, 2�0 J. AM. MEO. Ass'N 1757, I 757 ( 1 998) (suggesting 
th.it
.
screening, ev�n while subjects are asymptomatic, could prove helpful i n  terms ot disease prevention and would most likely be cost-effective) .  
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time horizon . 1 65 As with all statistics-based insurance strategies, this 
first demands that the risk pools be as large as possible. Addition­
ally, insurers and employers should be given incentives to use stan­
dard policies that group together as many patients as possible. 166 
While the health care insurance industry is already dominated by 
large corporations, they write thousands of separate plans, thus 
fragmenting the risk pools. The more difficult problem is that 
plans, or the employers who buy them, need to have an incentive to 
aggressively promote preventive medical services. This means that 
rate decisions need to be made on large pools over a multi-year 
time horizon. From a health p o licy perspective, h ealth insurance 
should be written on multi-yea r  contracts with limits on rate in­
creases. This  has been unpopular because it implies also that the 
insureds would have to be locked into a single plan. However, if 
the pools of insureds were large enough and spanned enough em­
ployers , and if all plans faced the same requirements, then there 
would be little incentive to switch plans. 
4. Muting the Demographics of Aging 
The most important factor increasing health care costs is the 
relentless push of demographics.  As the population increases, 
which it is slated to do for many years to come, the total cost of 
health care increases. As the number of elderly persons increases 
as a percentage of the population, the cost of health care per capita 
again increases. As the numbe r  of unhealthy persons, either 
through life style choices or now-survivable genetic diseases, in­
creases, the cost of care increases further still. Like lifestyle 
changes, a b urgeoning aged and ill population increases medical 
cost in a way that cannot be controlled by the IOM' s  guidelines. 
For example, using guidelines, surgical intervention for coronary 
artery disease can be limited to individuals with three-vessel disease. 
But, because the incidence of coronary artery disease increases with 
age, we will soon be paying for more coronary intervention regard-
1 65. See Thomas R. McLean, Medicine v. Health Insurance: A Tale of Two Indus­
tries 24 (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript, on file with the NYU Annual Survey of 
American Law) . 
166. The IOM chides the practice of medicine for being variable, overly com­
plex'. and needlessly inefficient. The truth is that all of these terms apply to the medical insurance industry. See id. at 4 (" (O] ur health insurance system is also a 
complex and inefficient system" ) .  
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less.167 Finally, as medical science develops m�re tre�tn�ents for 
previously poorly treatable conditions, the cost of care will 1�crease. 
The increase of elderly in the population is overloadmg the 
Medicare system, a problem that, while hardly new, will o.nly get worse as the baby boom population ages. When people reure,  
.
the 
cost of their care shifts to the federal government at the same ume 
that most of them stop paying taxes. The burden of paying for 
their care, as well as for their social security payments, shifts to the 
remaining working population. When sixty-five was adopted as �he 
retirement age, approximately three percent of the population 
reached sixty-five. Now, life expectancy is more than seventy-seven 
years, and a significant number of persons are surviving well be­
yond that age. While current literature shows that most of these 
older people are healthier than their  counterparts in previous gen­
erations, they are still not as healthy on average as younger persons, 
and will dramatically raise the cost of care over a comparable num­
ber of persons in middle age. This means that the real health care 
economics problem is retirement, not age. 
Shifting the retirement age to seventy would have a profound 
effect on the finances of the social s ecurity system and the Medicare 
system, as well as increasing state and federal tax revenues. While 
this would not reduce health care costs, it would make many more 
of them pay-as-you-go, and take the burden off other workers and 
the government. This would free up state and federal money which 
could be used to broaden access to care for those who are unem­
ployed or working in jobs without health insurance. Increasing the 
retirement age to seventy would b e  perhaps the most intellectually 
ho�est and .
straightforward solution to controlling Medicare and 
Social Security expenditures, which would raise the GNP and defray 
rising health care costs. 
C. Conclusions 
Ultimately, society must confront the question of how much it 
sp�nds on health care. While economists worry about health care 
?
emg too large a part of the GNP , this fear is based on old-fash­
�one� notions of an industrial economy dominated by manufactur-
ing I tiH Health · d . · · care is a very 1verse service industry based on 
1 67. Other countries take a more direct approach to controlling health care cost and do not pay for coronary intervention over a certain age. See McLean, .111/mz note 1 39,  at 343, 361 n . 1 30. 
. 1 68. This statement is made with the assumption that health care is not paid tor hy employers. If employers pay for h e alth care and then add it to the cost of �oods sold, a nation's economy is disadvantaged in the global market place as 
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knowledge, h i gh tec h nology, and personal services. It  is also a very 
local indusll)'· Health care jobs , u n l ike manufacturing jobs and 
even software e n ginee ringj obs, are i n no danger of being exported 
to foreign cotmtries.  l li\I The problem with health care spending is 
not that it is too large a part of th e GNP, but that it is paid for in 
ways that distort the job market and make it unavailable for many 
persons in society. Many Americans are horrified by European tax 
rates, yet when all the costs of privately paid-for benefits such as 
health care are added to the tax bill ,  middle class tax payers proba­
bly pay as much or more than their E u ropean counterparts, and get 
less for it. 1 70 As we discussed earlier in this paper, a key reason why 
h ealth care is m ore expensive in the United States is that i t  i nc ludes 
many direct and indirect social welfare costs that would either be 
reduced in Europe or paid under a different umbrella. T h e re is no 
health care will make up a larger portion of its spending. Thomas R. McLean, 
Cybersurge1y: Innovation nr a Merms to Close Community Hospitals and Displace Physi­
cians, 20J. MARSHALL]. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 495, 5 1 1  (2002) ("Simply put, health 
care benefits . . .  act like a tax on U.S. products and seivices thereby making these 
products and services less desirable in the global market place.")  [hereinafter 
Cybersurgel): Innovation] ;  Tom McLean, Deep Pockets: The Liability of Risk Managed 
Care O!ganizations for Medical Mal/mtctice, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE UPDATE 231 
(Aspen Law & Business 2003 ) ;  Thomas R. McLean, Stealth v. Health: The Compl.exity 
0! Tort &form, 1 2 LEGAL MED. PERSP. ( Mar.-Apr. 2003) ,  availabl.e a t  http:// 
WWW:aclm.org/ pu blications/lmpvol. 1 2_ 4supplement.asp (discussing need to cut 
medical spending in order to "make American business more competi tive in the 
global market place")  (on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law) .  
169. As  telemedicine and cybersurgery improve, this statement may not  be 
t�e in five to ten years. See CybersurgeJY: Innovation, supra note 1 68, at 5 1 4-15 
(discussing the economic arguments for "out.sourcingn surgery to foreign doctors);  
Thoma� R. McLean, Cybersurgel): An Argument for Enterprise Liability, 23 J.  LEGAL 
MEn. 167, 1 68 (2002) (" [I]n the not too distant future, physicians wil l  use ad­
vanced telemedicine technology in heretofore unintended ways to p erform cyber­
surgery, that is, physicians will use telemedicine and computer-assisted robotics to 
perform surgery on remote patients.n )  . 
. 1 �O. An important subject that is beyon d  the scope of this article is i nsurance administrative costs. Europeans have cheaper health care because a single payor 
system is much more efficient than the polymorphic health insurance system of 
America. It has been estimated that America could cut its health care costs by 
approximately fifty percent if America adopted a single payor national health in­
surance system. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying For National 
Health Insurance-And Not Getting It, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 94; see also 
McLean, supra note 1 65, at 16-18 (suggesting that, even if Woolhandler and Him­
melstein's fifty percent projected reduction is unrealistic, "consolidation of the 
U.S. health insurance market down to a single payor system . . .  offers some distinct 
advantages for the United States") . 
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free lunch, and if the United State s  does not address its social wel­
fare problems directly, it is not surprising that associated costs ulti­
mately surface in the only program that the United States does 
support: medical care. 
